GEH-6723P

Mark* VIeS Safety Control

Functional Safety Manual

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Document Updates

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Related Documents

Safety Symbol Legend

Indicates a procedure or condition that, if not strictly observed, could result in personal injury or death.

Indicates a procedure or condition that, if not strictly observed, could result in damage to or destruction of equipment.

Indicates a procedure or condition that should be strictly followed to improve these applications.

Contents

1 Introduction

The Mark* VIeS Safety control is a stand-alone safety control system used by operators knowledgeable in safety-instrumented system (SIS) applications to reduce risk in critical safety functions. It is a derivative of the Mark VIe control system used in a variety of power plant applications. The Mark VIeS Safety control is programmed and configured with the same ToolboxST^{*} application that is used in the Mark VIe control. The Mark VIeS Safety controller and distributed I/O module firmware are enhanced for safety control use. Specific Mark VIe control hardware has also been identified for use in safety control systems.

While the Mark VIeS control performs the logic solving tasks for the system, it can also interface with the ToolboxST application. The ToolboxST application can interface with an external distributed control systems (DCS). It provides a means to lock or unlock the Mark VIeS control for configuration and safety-instrumented function (SIF) programming. This allows you to install a safety function, test it, and place the controller in *Locked* mode to perform safety control.

Mark VIeS Control as Part of a SIS

Interfaces to the Mark VIeS control must be strictly controlled to avoid interference with the operation of the system. Data exchange to the safety control must be restricted and only used when validated by the application software.

The Mark VIeS control was designed and certified to meet functional safety standards according to *IEC 61508* Parts 1 through 3. It is certified for use in both high-and low-demand applications. The Mark VIeS control uses redundant architecture configurations and a hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of 1 to achieve safety integrity level (SIL) 3. The highest achievable SIL with an HFT of 0 is SIL 2.

Notes

2 Functional Safety

IEC 61508-4 definitions are as follows:

Safety Freedom from unacceptable risk.

Risk Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.

Functional Safety Part of the overall safety relating to the equipment under control (EUC) and the EUC control system that depends on the correct functioning of the Electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems, and external risk reduction facilities.

2.1 Risk Reduction

Functional safety relates to proper equipment operation, as well as other risk reduction facilities. Layers of protection (LOP) concepts are as follows:

LOP

The LOP around a process can be used to introduce risk reduction. Failure to carefully analyze the available LOP and the likelihood-consequence relationship of the risks involved with process control failure can lead to an expensive over-design of the system. The goal is to reduce the risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

To achieve functional safety, it is necessary to analyze the potential hazards to personnel and property, including any environmental impact, that could occur when the control of equipment is lost.

Requirements for safety function and integrity must be met to achieve functional safety. Safety function requirements describe what the safety function does and is derived from the hazard analysis. The safety integrity requirement is a quantitative measure of the likelihood that a safety function will perform its assigned task adequately. For safety functions to be effectively identified and implemented, the system as a whole must be considered.

A primary parameter used in determining the risk reduction in a safety controller is the Average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg). The inverse of the PFDavg is the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF).

 $RRF = \frac{1}{PFD_{avg}}$

2.1.1 Modes of Operation

A demand mode is a mode operation in which the safety function is called upon only on demand. *IEC 61508-4* clause 3.5.12 defines two demand modes of operation:

- Low demand mode
- High demand or continuous mode

Low demand describes the mode in which safety function demand occurs no greater than once per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency. In high demand mode, the frequency of demand is greater than once per year or greater than twice the proof test frequency. Continuous mode is regarded as very high demand and is associated with the safety function operating to keep the EUC within its normal safe state.

The mode of operation is relevant when determining the target failure measure of a safety function. Low demand mode relates to the PFDavg whereas high demand or continuous demand mode relates to measuring the probability of failure per hour (PFH) (there are approximately 104 hours in a year). IEC 61508 defines a scale of four distinct levels of risk reduction referred to as the Safety Integrity Level (SIL).

The SIL applies to all elements in the safety loop (sensors, logic solver, and final element) and their architecture. The loop must be considered in its entirety.

2.2 Hazard and Risk Analysis

Hazard and risk analyses determine the necessary safety functions and the required levels of risk reduction (refer to *IEC 61508-5:1998*). The recommended safety life cycle stipulates the completion of a hazard and risk analysis early in the process.

A hazard analysis, the identification of potential sources of harm, determines the causes and consequences of hazardous events. A team of professionals, familiar with both the EUC and safety-related systems, typically conducts the hazard analysis.

A risk analysis is typically defined in three stages: hazard identification, hazard analysis, and risk assessment. Risk analysis, like hazard analysis, requires a large spectrum of expertise and a team effort is required to produce a viable result. Annexes A – F of *IEC 61511-3* provides guidance in producing a risk analysis.

2.3 Safety Life Cycle

The safety life cycle is crucial to the philosophy of functional safety. The safety life cycle involves the following recommended stages:

- **1.** Functional safety management including functional safety assessment
- **2.** Safety life cycle structure and planning
- **3.** Hazard and risk analysis
- **4.** Allocation of safety functions to protection layers
- **5.** Safety requirements specification for the safety control
- **6.** Design and engineering of safety control
- **7.** Design and development of other means of risk reduction
- **8.** Installation, validation, and commissioning
- **9.** Operation and maintenance
- **10.** Modification and retrofit
- **11.** Decommissioning

IEC 61511 defines how to use the safety life cycle to achieve the desired SIL. Although the safety life cycle is described here and in *IEC* 61511 as a sequence of stages, in practice it is a repetitive process. If, for example, a modification is required in the operational system, an impact analysis is required and the design changes should be reassessed starting with the hazard and risk analysis phase. Furthermore, for each safety function a hazard and risk analysis is required to define the safety function requirements and required SIL.

2.4 Functional Safety Management

Functional safety must be managed during the entire time of the safety life cycle. *IEC 61511* clause 5 describes the objectives and requirements for the management of functional safety. The functional safety management plan should be a formal document that outlines the activities related to functional safety and the persons in the organization responsible for those activities. It should also include functional safety assessment and audit planning.

IEC 61508 provides additional guidance about completing an effective functional safety management plan. The tables of technique and measures in Annex A and B of *IEC 61508* Tab 1, 2, and 3 are particularly useful.

3 System Design

This chapter describes the components that are critical to system implementation. The internal structure of the Mark VIeS control is displayed in the following figure.

Mark VIeS Safety Control within Entire Application

3.1 Primary Architecture Components

A Mark VIeS control for any supported architecture is built using a common set of safety approved components connected by a combination of direct wiring and the *IONet* communications bus. The Mark VIeS I/O signal path consists of three basic parts: terminal board, I/O pack, and IONet.

3.1.1 Terminal Boards

Terminal boards mount on the cabinet and are of two basic types: S and T. The S-type board provides wire terminals for each I/O point and allows a single I/O pack to condition and digitize the signal. This terminal board is used for simplex, dual, and dedicated triple modular redundant (TMR) inputs and outputs by using one, two, or three boards. The T-type is a fanned TMR board that typically fans the inputs to three separate I/O packs. For outputs, the T-type hardware provides a mechanism to vote the outputs from the three I/O packs.

Both S-type and T-type terminal boards provide the following features:

- Terminal blocks for I/O wiring
- Mounting hardware
- Input transient protection
- I/O pack connectors
- Unique electronic ID

The following terminal board interfaces are available for field I/O:

3.1.2 I/O Packs

Mark VIeS I/O packs contain a common processor board and a data acquisition board that is unique to the type of device to which it is connected. I/O packs on each terminal board digitize signals, perform algorithms, and communicate with the Mark VIeS controller. I/O packs provide fault detection through special circuitry in the data acquisition board and software running in the CPU board. The fault status is transmitted to, and used by, the controllers. Each I/O pack transmits inputs and receives outputs on both network interfaces if connected.

3.1.2.1 Process I/O

Typical process inputs include contact, analog, and thermocouple signals. Typical process outputs include relays and analog outputs. All typical process outputs based on inputs are processed by the system controller. The following process I/O packs are available for use in the Mark VIeS control:

3.1.2.2 Application-specific I/O

Mark VIeS Safety control system includes GE application-specific functions. The ability to accept local inputs and drive local outputs independent of the system controller differentiates these from the typical process I/O. GE application-specific I/O types include pulse rate speed inputs and flame detectors. In the Mark VIeS control, the following application-specific I/O packs are available:

The YPRO, YTUR, and YSIL process speed signals and operate trip relays locally, without requiring controller participation. The compatible mating terminal boards detect the correct operation of the tripping relay output circuits. YTUR includes a non-certified but non-interfering capability to synchronize a generator to a utility grid and control a connection breaker. The YPRO and YSIL include a non-interfering backup synchronizing check.

Turbine overspeed protection is available as follows: control, primary, and backup. The controller provides primary overspeed protection. The TTUR terminal board and YTUR I/O pack carry a shaft speed signal to each controller, which select the median signal. If the controller finds a trip condition, it sends the trip signal to the TRPG terminal board through YTUR. A three-relay voting circuit (one for each trip solenoid) performs a two out of three vote of the three YTUR outputs and removes power from the solenoids. The YPRO adds firmware and hardware based redundant overspeed protection.

Turbine Protection with YTUR and YPRO

YSIL I/O Functions

3.1.3 IONet

The controllers and I/O packs communicate through the internal IONet (a closed network), using a proprietary IONet protocol. IONet communications are as follows:

- I/O packs that multicast inputs to the controllers each frame
- Controllers that broadcast outputs to the I/O packs each frame

3.2 Safety-instrumented Functions (SIF)

Mark VIeS SIF configurations are created and maintained in the ToolboxST application, along with the basic process control configurations. This environment provides all the facilities to create, download, and maintain these configurations.

Mark VIeS controllers have two operating modes for application execution. When in *Unlocked* mode, full access to the controller is granted, including the ability to download code, set constants, force points, and all other configuration and diagnostic operations. When in *Locked* mode, all changes to the controller operation are prevented to ensure the integrity of the safety functions.

Within the Mark VIeS controller, *branding* is used to support Locked mode and integrity checks. When the controller is unlocked and the operator is satisfied with the system operation, the system configuration is branded so that it can be uniquely identified. Once branded, a diagnostic alarm is generated if there are any changes to application code, constants, hardware integrity, or network connectivity. The diagnostics based on branding include all communications through the IONet to provide 100% network diagnostic coverage (DC) independent of the network hardware selected.

The typical sequence of application creation includes:

- Application development
- Hardware connection and configuration
- Function testing while unlocked
- Application branding (after being tested and proven)
- Placing the controller in Locked mode

3.2.1 Controller Application Code

Changes to the application code must be completely verified and tested prior to use in a SIF. The Mark VIeS Safety control provides several features to facilitate changes and track the state of application code acceptance. The following table lists the function blocks approved for SIL3 use per IEC 61508-3 that are available for use in SIFs.

SIF Function Blocks

SIF Function Blocks (continued)

Any block that is included in the SIL Block Library (GEI-100691.pdf) but is not listed in the previous table, *SIF Function Blocks* **is not available for use in SIFs.**

3.2.1.1 Variable Health

Inside the Mark VIeS Safety controller, every variable is associated with a set of qualities that provide additional information, or support advanced features such as forcing, simulation, or alarms. Some of these qualities are visible to users through ToolboxST application, and others are made available to application code through blockware.

Variable health measures the validity of the data stored in the variable. When the ToolboxST application collects variable data from the controller, it also scans the health information and displays a *U* (for unhealthy) beside each live data value if the corresponding health quality is FALSE. The Variable Health block (VAR_HEALTH) allows application code to access variable health. The Prevote block (PREVOTE) allows application code to access prevote values and health.

The health of a variable with no connection to I/O is always TRUE and therefore uninteresting. Also, output health is always TRUE. The health of variables associated with I/O is calculated from point and link health. *Point health* originates from software close to the hardware. *Link health* is calculated by the controller. These two values are passed through a logical AND gate to form variable health.

Each I/O server defines the non user-configurable point and group health. For example, the point health of an analog input may be declared unhealthy if its value exceeds some limit, and the point health of all inputs on an I/O pack may be declared unhealthy if a problem is detected in the signal acquisition hardware. It may not be practical for an I/O server to provide a health indication for each individual point and so this component of variable health is optional.

In a Mark VIeS Safety control, I/O is typically distributed at the I/O packs or across another network such as the Unit Data Highway (UDH). As such, the controller provides link health by validating that all transport layer checks between the I/O server and the controller are met. These may include timely delivery, signature matching, and checksums.

Redundant I/O features complicate the explanation of the variable health calculation. A TMR input module supplies three opinions of variable health to the controller. Since these inputs are voted, as long as two out of three are healthy, the resulting variable is also healthy.

A dual input module (either simplex I/O pack, dual network; or dual I/O pack, single network) provides two opinions of variable health to the controller. Since the controller cannot vote two opinions, it uses link health to select one of the channels and incorporates only the selected channel's point and group information into the variable health calculation. If the link health on the selected channel ever becomes unhealthy, the controller immediately switches to the second channel.

The VAR_HEALTH block reveals the variable health and the link health of the connected variable. Application developers can choose to monitor the health of individual variables or the health of the network (link) that supplies many variables, especially if the I/O on the other end of that network does not provide any additional health information. For TMR inputs, the link health pin provides a voted link health (that is, two out of three channels). For dual inputs, the link health pin provides the health of the selected channel.

The following ToolboxST screen displays a TMR YDIA with two faulted channels. Because of the faults, all points on the YDIA are marked as unhealthy.

From the **PreVote** tab, the T channel is healthy but the R and S channels are not, due to loss of communication.

Variable Health Example

The following ToolboxST screen displays a VAR_HEALTH block. Both variables are connected to the faulted YDOA. Since the cause of the fault is communication, both the HEALTH1 and LINKOK1 output pins are False.

3.2.1.2 Temperature Monitor

There are two application code blocks available for monitoring the safety controller's temperature: TEMP_STATUS and CTRLR_MON. These controller application code blocks can be used to set alarms, actuate fans, or perform other actions appropriate for the specific environment in which the control cabinet is placed.

3.2.2 Locked Mode

The Mark VIeS Safety control provides a level of protection (LOP) against accidental modification of the safety software through *Locked* mode. In general, all functions or features that have the potential to modify the controller are disabled when in locked mode, for example:

- Variable and constant modification
- Variable forcing
- Application code download
- Firmware download
- Restart commands from ToolboxST application
- External file writes to flash memory
- Low-level diagnostic commands
- Time set commands

The controller starts in *Locked* mode and remains there until an *Unlock* command is received from the ToolboxST application. When the controller receives a *Lock* command from the ToolboxST application or the controller is restarted, it returns to *Locked* mode. When the controller is unlocked, it generates a diagnostic alarm to log the event. The controller tracks its lock state through a configuration variable (for example, *Is_Locked_R*), viewable through the application code, so that appropriate control action can be taken or an external contact can be driven, if desired.

➢ **To lock the controllers**

- **1.** From the Component Editor toolbar, click the key icon. The **Lock / Unlock** dialog box displays.
- **2.** Click the **Lock All** button and the controllers status displays as Locked.

3.2.3 Unlocked Mode

While in *Unlocked* **mode, the Mark VIeS is not inherently less safe than when in** *Locked* **mode, as SIF implementation is the same. However, when unlocked, the controller could become unsafe, as it is open to modifications that could lead to an unsafe condition.**

The Mark VIeS allows online application code changes in *Unlocked* mode. Take every precaution to ensure that any online change to application code does not cause an unintended error during the download. This is particularly relevant for dual network configurations in which separate I/O packs are driven by either redundant controller.

The application code does not normally allow safety loops to be activated in *Unlocked* mode. To test a loop in *Unlocked* mode, the permissives preventing operation must be temporarily forced out.

When online repair is required on an operating, redundant system, it is not necessary to unlock the control system to download software. Non-configured I/O packs and controllers boot into Unlocked mode, allowing them to receive the initial software download. The lock status of all the components can be determined by running a download scan.

➢ **To unlock the Mark VIeS Safety controller**

- **1.** From the ToolboxST Component Editor toolbar, click the **Lock/Unlock** (key) icon.
- **2.** From the Lock/Unlock dialog box, click the **Unlock All** button and the controllers status displays as Unlocked.

The Locked state of each controller is displayed at the bottom of the Status tab. If a controller is unlocked and its branded application changed through download, then a diagnostic alarm is generated to announce that the branded application is no longer running. This diagnostic alarm cannot be cleared until the new application is *branded*.

3.2.4 Forced Variables

The controller cannot be locked if any variables are currently forced. All forces must be cleared before issuing a lock command from the ToolboxST application. Forces are not maintained during a startup cycle, so restarting the controller is one method of clearing forces and putting the controller back into the *Locked* mode.

3.2.5 Online Repair

When online repair is required on an operating, redundant system, it is not necessary to unlock the control system to download software. Non-configured I/O packs and controllers boot into Unlocked mode, allowing them to receive the initial software download. The lock status of all the components can be determined by running a download scan.

3.2.6 Branding

Application code and configuration that is part of a SIF must be certified per *IEC 61511* prior to use. To facilitate this activity, the controller allows the user to designate a particular set of code as acceptable for its intended purpose. In the ToolboxST application, this process is called *branding*. Branding is also required after upgrades from BPPB to BPPC based Safety I/O packs.

When the code is branded, the controller calculates a checksum of all application code and configuration information, and retains it in nonvolatile memory. Whenever the application code or I/O pack configuration is modified, the controller detects the difference and generates a diagnostic alarm. Similarly, until the application code has been initially branded, a diagnostic alarm will be active noting the fact.

The current cyclic redundancy check (CRC) values are displayed by the ToolboxST application and available to the application code (such as *CurrentAppCrc_R*). If any I/O pack faults or is turned off, the controllers interpret this as a CRC difference and the diagnostic alarm is generated.

Connected to SIL_TMR-R

Before Download

After download but before branding, the following Status displays.

A yellow brand indicates that the application currently running in the controller does not match the previous brand and needs to be certified and branded prior to use in a SIF.

Note To download an application code change, the controllers must be unlocked.

➢ **To brand the controller's application and configuration:** from the ToolboxST **Component Editor** toolbar, click the **Brand** icon**.**

After branding, the text turns green and all three controllers match. The controllers are also *locked* to prevent further changes.

Branded and Locked

3.2.7 Startup Shutdown Process

The safety control system can shut down either by manual operator action or automatically as a result of certain detected fault conditions. A number of protective features are included in the Mark VIeS Safety control to ensure that a SIF is not compromised by inadvertent modifications made to the system. These features include an operating *Locked* mode, which prevents unwanted changes, and application code branding, which detects configuration changes.

3.2.7.1 Manual Shutdown

A manual shutdown occurs when the controller power supply is manually turned off. When power is reapplied, the controller proceeds through control startup states that are designed to synchronize its application states with the other redundant controllers. Forced values are not retained through a power down cycle. If forced values exist and only one controller of a redundant set is restarted, forcing will be restored and the restarted controller will obtain those forced values from the designated controller during the Data Initialization control state. The restarted controller enters the same locked state as the designated controller.

3.2.7.2 Fault Detected Shutdown

When fault conditions are detected, the Mark VIeS controller either restarts or enters a fail-safe control state, depending on the type of fault condition. In the event of a processor restart, the I/O packs are programmed to operate in their fail-safe state.

The controller restarts on three conditions:

- Software watchdog timeout
- Hardware watchdog timeout
- Operating system process control failure

The watchdog timer functions are generally meant to ensure safe controller operation in conditions where one or more runtime processes are overloaded. Each periodic safety-critical process initializes and then continually tickles one or more software watchdog timers, which are implemented by the system firmware process and configured with expected tickle rates. If a watchdog timer is tickled too quickly, too slowly, or not at all, the system process restarts the controller.

When using a hardware watchdog timer, a backup watchdog process is also implemented. If this process fails to tickle the hardware watchdog timer quickly enough, the board restarts.

In addition to watchdog timeouts, a process control failure in the operating system can cause an automatic restart. If any runtime process, other than the system process, fails to run due to a problem, the operating system prompts the system process to restart the controller. If the system process fails, the hardware watchdog process detects the failure of the software watchdog function and forces a restart by not tickling the hardware watchdog timer.

A different set of fault conditions cause the controller to enter its fail-safe control state, instead of restarting the controller. In this state, the controller outputs to the I/O packs are disabled, forcing the I/O packs, in turn, to enter their fail-safe state. In this state, I/O packs drive their physical outputs to safe values as configured.

In the controller, the sequencer process continuously conducts the following program flow integrity malfunction tests:

- Critical process order of execution
- Critical process scheduling overrun and under-run
- Frame period
- Frame state timeout intervals
- Frame number

If any of these tests fail three consecutive times (generally three frames), appropriate diagnostic alarms are generated. After five successive failures, the system is placed in the fail-safe control state.

3.3 Online SIFs

The Mark VIeS control components used by the online SIFs and their interconnections in TMR architecture are displayed in the following figure.

Controller and I/O – TMR Control Mode

The figure also illustrates the top-level architecture for SIL 3 capability, using a TMR, 2 out of 3, safety architecture. This deployment architecture is referred to in Mark VIeS documentation as the TMR Control Mode.

3.4 Redundancy

The Mark VIeS Safety control can be set up in various traditional safety architectures that allow selections among SIL capability, availability, and cost to better serve the specific needs of an application. TMR, dual, and simplex control modes are supported.

The controllers are designated as R, S, and T in a TMR system, R and S in a dual system, and R in a simplex system. Each controller owns one IONet. The R controller sends outputs to an I/O module through the R IONet, the S controller sends outputs through the S IONet, and the T controller sends outputs through the T IONet.

IONet features include:

- Ethernet User Datagram Protocol (UDP) using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) for network address assignments. While based on Ethernet hardware and protocol standards, the IONet is maintained as a separate physical network to avoid risks of interference from other network traffic.
- Full duplex Ethernet switches throughout, so no message collisions impact system timing
- IEEE® 1588 protocol through the R, S, and T IONets to synchronize the clock of the I/O modules and controllers to within ± 100 microseconds
- Coordination of IONet traffic and controller action to ensure minimum predictable latency for inputs (given IEEE 1588 timing alignment). Controller outputs take place at the same time and all output I/O packs exhibit consistent latency in processing and updating the outputs.

3.4.1 TMR Control Mode

In the TMR control mode, three independent controllers communicate with the I/O through three independent IONet channels. The TMR control mode with a hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of 1 is designed for SIL 3 capability with the running reliability of 2 out of 3 redundancy. Each independent controller receives three independent sets of input data, one from each IONet for 2 out of 3 input voting. Controller outputs are 2 out of 3 voted in the output circuitry. TMR control mode functions are as follows:

- TMR (2 out of 3): SIL 3 high and low demand for de-energize-to-trip applications
- TMR (2 out of 3): SIL 2 low demand for energize-to-trip applications
- TMR (2 out of 3): SIL 2 high and low demand vibration (YVIBS1A) applications
- Degraded TMR (1 out of 2): SIL 3 high and low demand for de-energize-to-trip applications
- TMR degradation sequence: (2 out of 3) \rightarrow (1 out of 2) \rightarrow Fail Safe

When TMR controllers are present in a system, dual and simplex inputs and simplex outputs, in addition to TMR I/O pack, can be used. This allows for a mix of redundancy within a single system. Some I/O packs can be TMR to support SIL 3 for critical safety functions, while other I/O packs can use less hardware and support a lower SIL for less critical functions.

the discrete actuator.

TMR redundancy for I/O packs can be either dedicated (each mounted to individual S-type terminal boards) or TMR fanned (each mounted to a single T-type terminal board). With TMR, each I/O pack for field input and output is uniquely associated with only one IONet.

With TMR fanned I/O, each input point is read by three independent I/O packs that receive the actual field input through a common terminal board that fans the input to each of the three I/O packs. Each I/O pack receives output messages from its own controller. The three independent I/O pack outputs are then 2 out of 3 hardware voted on a common terminal board.

TMR Fanned Mode with Three I/O Packs and One T-type Terminal Board

With TMR dedicated, the outputs or inputs for each I/O pack can be connected to an independent terminal board, allowing the 2 out of 3 voting to be performed in the field output devices outside the Mark VIeS control.

Dedicated Mode with Three I/O Packs and three S-type Terminal Boards
3.4.2 Dual Control Mode

The dual control mode contains two controllers, two IONets, and either a single I/O pack or fanned TMR I/O packs. In a dual system, the level of I/O reliability can be varied to meet the application needs for specific I/O packs.

Dual control mode functions are as follows:

- Dual (1 out of 2): SIL 3 high and low demand for de-energize-to-trip applications.
- Dual (1 out of 2): SIL 2 high and low demand vibration (YVIBS1A) applications
- Dual (2 out of 2): SIL 2 low demand for energize and de-energize-to-trip applications
- Dual (2 out of 2): SIL 1 low demand vibration (YVIBS1A) applications

In a dual Mark VIeS Safety control, both controllers receive inputs from the I/O packs on both networks and continuously transmit outputs on their respective IONet. Since redundant data is transmitted continuously from the I/O pack and controller, both the pack and controller must select which network to use.

two modules.

At power up, the controller or I/O pack listens for data on both networks. The channel that delivers the first valid packet becomes the preferred network. The I/O pack or controller uses this data as long as the data continues to arrive on that channel. If the preferred channel does not deliver the data in a frame, the other channel becomes the preferred channel if it supplies valid data. This prevents a given I/O pack/controller from bouncing back and forth between two sources of data. As a result, different I/O packs/controllers may have separate preferred data sources, but this can also happen if a component fails.

3.4.2.1 Single I/O Pack Dual Network I/O Module

The I/O option A is a single I/O pack dual network I/O module setup. This configuration is typically used for single sensor I/O. A single sensor connects to a single set of acquisition electronics but connects to two networks.

Dual Mode with One I/O Pack and Two IONets

The I/O pack delivers input data on both networks at the beginning of the frame and receives output data from both controllers at the end of the frame. The reliability and availability features include:

- HFT₀
- Single data acquisition
- Redundant network

3.4.2.2 Dual Single I/O Pack Single Network I/O Module

The I/O option B is two single pack, single network I/O modules. This configuration is typically used for inputs that have multiple sensors monitoring the same process points. Two sensors are connected to two independent I/O modules.

Dual Mode with Two Single Pack, Single IONet Modules

Each I/O pack delivers input data on a separate network at the beginning of the frame and receives output data from separate controllers at the end of the frame. The reliability and availability features include:

- HFT₁
- Redundant sensors
- Redundant data acquisition
- Redundant network
- Online repair

3.4.2.3 Triple I/O Pack Dual Network I/O Module

The I/O option C is a special case mainly intended for outputs but can also apply to inputs. The special output voting/driving features of the TMR I/O modules can be used in a dual control system. The inputs from these modules are selected in the controller.

Dual Mode with Three I/O Packs and Two Simplex and One Duplex IONet

Two I/O packs connect to separate networks to deliver input data and receive output data from separate controllers. The third I/O pack is connected to both networks. This I/O pack delivers inputs on both networks and receives outputs from both controllers. The reliability and availability features include:

- HFT 1
- Redundant data acquisition
- Output voting in hardware
- Redundant network
- Online repair

3.4.3 Simplex Control Mode, 1 out of 1

Simplex (1 out of 1) control mode is SIL 2 low demand capable for de-energize-to-trip and SIL 1 for vibration applications. Each I/O pack delivers an input packet at the beginning of the frame on its primary network. The controller sees the inputs from all I/O packs, runs application code, and delivers a broadcast output packet(s) that contains the outputs for all I/O modules.

3.5 Control and Protection

3.5.1 Output Processing

The system outputs must be transferred to the external hardware interfaces and then to the various actuators controlling the process. TMR outputs are voted in the output voting hardware, and any system can also output individual signals through simplex hardware.

The three voting controllers calculate TMR system outputs independently. Each controller sends the output to its associated I/O hardware (for example, R controller sends to R IONet). A voting mechanism then combines the three independent outputs into a single output. Different signal types require different methods of establishing the voted value.

The signal outputs from the three controllers fall into three groups:

- Outputs driven as single-ended non-redundant outputs from individual IONets
- Outputs on all three IONets that are merged into a single signal by the output hardware
- Outputs on all three IONets that are output separately to the controlled process. This process may contain external voting hardware.

For normal relay outputs, the three signals feed a voting relay driver, which operates a single relay per signal. For more critical protective signals, the three signals drive three independent relays with the relay contacts connected in the typical six-contact voting configuration.

Relay Outputs for Protection

System Design GEH-6723P 41 For public disclosure

The following figure displays 4-20 mA signals combined through a 2 out of 3 current sharing circuit that votes the three signals to one. This unique circuit ensures the total output current is the voted value of the three currents. When the failure of a 4-20 mA output is sensed, a deactivating relay contact is opened.

TMR Circuit for Voted 4-20 mA Outputs

3.5.1.1 I/O Pack Communication Loss

Each I/O pack monitors the IONet for valid commands from one or two controllers. If a valid command is not received within an expected time, the I/O pack declares communication as lost. Upon loss of communication, the I/O pack action is configurable as follows:

- The default action is the power-down state, as if the power were removed from the I/O pack
- Continue to hold the last commanded value indefinitely
- Commanded to go to a specified output state

For critical loops, the default action is the only acceptable choice because it is the assigned behavior for I/O pack failure on power loss failure. The other options are provided for non-critical loops in which running reliability may be enhanced by an alternate output.

3.5.2 Input Processing

All inputs are available to all three controllers and input data is handled in several ways. For those input signals that exist in only one I/O module, all three controllers use the same value as a common input without voting. Signals that appear in all three I/O channels are voted to create a single input value. The triple inputs can come from independent sensors or from a single sensor by hardware fanning at the terminal board.

I/O Configurations

For any of the input configurations, multiple inputs can be used to provide application redundancy. For example, three simplex inputs can be used and selected in application code to provide sensor redundancy.

The Mark VIeS control provides configuration capability for input selection and voting using a simple, reliable, and efficient selection/voting/fault detection algorithm. This reduces application configuration effort, maximizing the reliability options of a given set of inputs and providing output voting hardware compatibility. For a given controller topology, terminal board redundancy ≤ the controller topology is available. For example, in a TMR controller, all simplex and dual option capability is also provided.

While each IONet is associated with a specific controller, all controllers see all IONets. The result is that for a simplex input, the data is seen not only by the output owner of the IONet, but also by any other controllers in parallel. The benefit is that the loss of a controller associated with a simplex input does NOT result in the loss of that data. The simplex data continues to arrive at other controllers in the system.

A single input can be brought to the three controllers without any voting as indicated in the following figure. This is used for generic I/O, such as monitoring 4-20 mA inputs, contacts, and thermocouples.

Single Input without Software Voting

For medium integrity applications with medium to high reliability sensors, one sensor can be fanned to three I/O boards as shown in the following figure. Three such circuits are needed for three sensors. Typical inputs include 4-20 mA inputs, contacts, and thermocouples.

One Sensor with Fanned Input and Software Voting

Three independent sensor inputs can be brought into the controllers without voting to provide the individual sensor values to the application. Median values can be selected in the controller if required. This configuration, displayed in the following figure, is used for special applications only.

Three Independent Sensors with Common Input, Not Voted

3.6 Critical System Timing Parameters

Critical System Timing Parameters control is a discrete time, sampled system. The fundamental frame rate or scan period of the controller is selectable by the user (10 ms, 40 ms, 80 ms, or 160 ms) and should be related to the required process safety time for the fastest SIF in the system. The following figure provides a typical sequence of events within the scan frame (40 ms is shown in this example).

 $\prod_{i=1}^{n}$ Activities that span multiple subsystems identified with a dashed line rectangle Activities that span multiple subsystems identified with a dashed line rectangle

3.6.1 Maximum Remote I/O Stimulus to Response Time

The Mark VIeS Safety control and I/O has a worst case response time of < 300 ms. It is suitable for use in a SIF with a process safety time (PST) of 500 ms or higher and does not consume more than 60% of this budget. The individual components of the timing analysis are as follows:

- If input changes directly after last input sample, the worst case delay on the sample is one frame period (10, 40, 80 or 160) ms)
- Input sample to transmit over IONet is \leq 5 ms
- Controller receives inputs, runs programs, and sends outputs in < one frame period (10, 40, 80 or 160 ms)
- Output receives updated outputs and sets physical outputs in \leq 5 ms
- Physical output relays have a worst case 40 ms response.
- Total worst case time without any lost IONet communication is $2 \times$ frame period $+ 50 \text{ ms}$ (for input or output transfer).
- Worst case additional communication delay due to lost message without timeout is $3 \times$ frame period up and $1 \times$ frame period down, or 4 x frame period total.
- Total worse case response without timeout[†] (including lost IONet communications) is 6 x frame period + 50 ms.
	- Assumes a frame period of either 10, 40, 80 or 160 ms
	- Assumes maximum number of messages missed in both directions
	- Assumes initial stimulus slightly missed previous input sample time
	- − Assumes common cause across IONets

Note † Timing assumes use of fastest input I/O pack filter settings. This is the sum of total worst case time without any lost IONet communication and worst case additional communications delay due to lost message without timeout.

Maximum Local I/O Stimulus to Response Time

The Mark VIeS Safety control turbine-specific I/O can supply high-speed I/O for turbine protection functions with a worst case response time of ≤ 60 ms. It is suitable for use in a SIF with a PST of 100 ms or higher, and does not consume more than 60% of the budget. The individual components of the timing analysis are as follows:

- Local I/O timing is independent of redundancy architecture
- Local I/O operates at 10 ms frame rate
- If input changes directly after last input sample, the worst case delay on the sample is 10 ms
- Input change to be seen by I/O processor board is \leq 5 ms
- Local control algorithm receives inputs, runs user programs, and sends outputs in 10 ms
- Physical output relays have a worst case 40 ms response
- Total worst case time 55 ms (for input or output transfer)

Note If TRPA or TREA with solid-state relays are used, relay response is < 1 ms. This reduces local response time to < 20 ms.

3.6.2 Diagnostic Interval

All system self-diagnostics are conducted within a one-hour interval.

3.6.3 Mark VIeS Safety Controller Response to Loss of Communication

3.6.3.1 Single Network I/O Pack Input

When communication between a controller and a one-network I/O pack fails, in the first frame the signal health is declared bad and the input variable is maintained at the last value received. During the third frame an alarm is generated. During the fifth frame the signal value is set to the default value.

Input Variables	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5
Health	Unhealthy				
Alarm			Send		
Values	Hold last				Default

Single Network I/O Pack Input Response to Loss of Input

3.6.3.2 Dual Network or Dual One-Network I/O Pack Input

Upon failure of IONet communication with a single input, dual network I/O pack or a dual input, one-network I/O pack, the controller responds as follows. During the first frame after loss, the controller declares the buffer health bad, drives the input variable by the remaining valid network input, and holds the signal as healthy. During the third frame, an alarm is generated and, during the fifth frame, the input buffer value is set to the default value.

Input Buffer	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5
Health	Unhealthy				
Alarm			Send		
Values	Hold last				Default
Input Variables					
Health	Healthy				
Values	2nd input				

Dual Network I/O Pack Input Response to Loss of First Input

When the second input is lost, the input variable health immediately goes bad and the value is held at the most recent value received. In the third frame, an alarm is generated. During the fifth frame, the input variable is set to the default value.

Dual Network I/O Pack Input Response to Loss of Second Input

Input Buffer	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5
Health	Unhealthy				
Alarm			Send		
Values	Hold last				Default
Input Variables					
Health	Unhealthy				
Values	Hold last				Default

3.6.3.3 Triple Redundant I/O Pack Input

The controller response to the loss of triple redundant input signals depends on the number of lost inputs. Upon loss of the first input signal, the prevote buffer for the lost signal is identified as unhealthy, held at the previous value for one frame, and set to the default value during successive frames. During the third frame, an alarm is generated, the input variable health remains good (HFT of 1), and the voted variable remains valid.

Upon loss of the second input, the input variable health is immediately set unhealthy and, for one frame, the prevote buffer is held at the most recent value. During the second frame, the input variable value is set to the default value. An alarm is generated during the third frame.

Prevote Buffer	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5
Health	Unhealthy				
Alarm			Send		
Values	Hold last	Default			
Input Variables					
Health	Unhealthy				
Values	Voted	Default (from vote)			

Controller Response to Loss of Second Input

Upon loss of the third input, the input variable health is immediately set unhealthy and, for one frame, the prevote buffer is held at the most recent value. During the first frame, the input variable value is set to the default value. An alarm is generated during the third frame.

Controller Response to Loss of Third Input

3.6.4 I/O Pack Response to Loss of Communication

3.6.4.1 Single Network I/O Pack Output

When an output pack does not receive communications from the controller, it holds the last value for one frame, goes to the defined condition in the second frame, and generates an alarm in the third frame. The defined output condition defaults to the power-down state and should be used in most safety systems. Options are provided so that the I/O pack continues to hold the most recent output or goes to a pre-defined output.

Outputs	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3
Health	Healthy		Unhealthy
Alarm			Send
Values	Hold last		Standby

Single Network I/O Pack Output Response to Loss of Input

3.6.4.2 Dual Network I/O Pack Output

When an output pack features two network inputs it responds to the loss of one network by using the output command from the other network. This selection takes place within the frame time and generates no observable fall-over time from the I/O pack. The command from the lost network is held for one frame and declared unhealthy in the second frame. An alarm is sent in the third frame.

Input Buffer	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3
Health	Healthy		Unhealthy
Alarm			Send
Values	Hold last		Zero ₁
Outputs			
Health	Healthy		
Values	2nd input		

Loss of First Input, Dual Network I/O Pack Output Response

When the second network is lost (both networks lost), the behavior is similar to the single network input pack. The output is held for the first frame after loss of command. In the second frame, the output moves to the defined condition and the output health is marked as bad. An alarm is generated in the third frame.

Loss of Second Input, Dual Network I/O Pack Output Response

Input Buffer	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3
Health	Healthy		Unhealthy
Alarm			Send
Values	Hold last		Zero
Outputs			
Health	Healthy		Unhealthy
Values	Hold last		Standby

3.7 Failure Analysis Probability

Reliability parameters for a given SIF are calculated using Markov models and the appropriate failure rates from the Mark VIeS failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis (FMEDA). For low-demand mode applications the PFDavg is calculated, while for high demand mode applications the PFH is calculated. In addition, the mean time to fail spurious (MTTFS) is calculated for both modes.

For the default Markov model calculation, the analysis assumes a SIF with three analog input, two digital input, and two digital output signals. The following table displays the results of the Markov model calculation for several Mark VIeS control configurations in low-demand mode applications. A proof test interval (PTI) of one, two, and three years is used, assuming a perfect proof test.

Markov Model Calculation for Several Mark VIeS Control Configurations

The following table displays the results of the Markov model calculation for two Mark VIeS Safety control configurations in high-demand mode applications.

3.8 System Configuration

Prior to use, each I/O pack must be configured in the ToolboxST application.

From the Component Editor Hardware

Note When configuring I/O packs, be sure that the I/O pack configuration matches the hardware configuration of the attached terminal board. Refer to the chapter, *I/O Configuration* for detailed hardware and software configuration tables and checklists for Mark VIeS I/O packs and terminal boards. Use the checklists to cross-check the board configuration with the hardware topology.

3.8.1 YAIC Analog Input/Output

The Analog Input/Output (YAICS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. The pack handles up to 10 analog inputs, the first 8 of which can be configured as \pm 5 V or \pm 10 V inputs, or 4-20 mA current inputs. The last two inputs can be configured as ± 1 mA or 4-20 mA inputs. Using 4-20 mA inputs yields better DC than voltage inputs.

YAIC is compatible with the TBAIS1C and STAI terminal boards. YAIC is only compatible with the S1C version of TBAI and will report a board compatibility problem with any other version.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.1.1 TBAI Analog Input/Output

The Analog Input/Output (TBAI) terminal board holds 10 analog inputs and 2 outputs connected directly to two terminal blocks mounted on the board. Each block has 24 terminals that accept up to #12 AWG wires. A shield terminal attachment point is located adjacent to each terminal block.

The TBAI can hold the following inputs and outputs:

- Analog input -two-wire, three-wire, and four-wire transmitter
- Analog input, externally powered transmitter
- Analog input, voltage \pm 5 V, \pm 10 V dc
- Analog output, 0-20 mA

A 24 V dc power supply is available on the terminal board for all transducers. The inputs can be configured as either voltage or current signals. The two analog output circuits are 4-20 mA. TBAI can be used with one or three YAIC I/O packs. Dual YAICs on TBAI are not supported.

TBAI I/O Capacity

3.8.1.2 STAI Simplex Analog Input

The Simplex Analog Input (STAI) terminal board holds 10 analog inputs and 2 analog outputs connected to a high-density Euro-block type terminal block. STAI is designed for DIN-rail or flat mounting. It can hold the same inputs and outputs as the TBAI terminal board.

A 24 V dc power supply is available on the terminal board for all transducers. The inputs can be configured as either voltage or current signals. The two analog output circuits are 0-20 mA.

Quantity	Analog Input Types
-8	\pm 10 V dc, or \pm 5 V dc, or 4-20 mA
	4-20 mA, or ± 1 mA
Quantity	Analog Output Types
	$0-20$ mA

STAI Input Capacity

3.8.2 YDIA Discrete Input

The Discrete Input (YDIAS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. The I/O pack accepts up to 24 contact inputs and terminal board specific feedback signals, and supports three different voltage levels. YDIA is compatible with seven terminal boards.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.2.1 TBCI Contact Input with Group Isolation

The Contact Input with Group Isolation (TBCI) terminal board accepts 24 dry contact inputs wired to two barrier type terminal blocks. Dc power is provided for contact excitation. TBCI accepts one, two, or three YDIA packs. Three versions of TBCI are available.

TBCI Input Capacity

3.8.2.2 STCI Simplex Contact Input

The Simplex Contact Input (STCI) terminal board accepts 24 contact inputs wired to a Euro-block type terminal block. The STCI is designed for DIN-rail or flat mounting and accepts a single YDIA. Four versions of STCI are available.

3.8.3 YDOA Discrete Output

The Discrete Output (YDOAS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. YDOA is capable of controlling up to 12 electromagnetic or solid-state relays and accepts terminal board specific feedback. YDOA is compatible with six terminal boards.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.3.1 TRLYS1B Relay Output with Coil Sensing

The Relay Output with coil sensing (TRLYS1B) terminal board accepts 12 relay outputs wired directly to two barrier type terminal blocks. Each block has 24 terminals that accept up to #12 AWG wires.

The first six relay circuits are jumper configurable either for dry, Form-C contact outputs, or to drive external solenoids. A standard 125 V dc or 115/230 V ac source, or an optional 24 V dc source, can be provided for field solenoid power. The next five relays are unpowered isolated Form-C contacts. Output 12 is an isolated Form-C contact, used for special applications requiring dedicated power from connector JG1. TRLYS1B supports a single YDOA on connector JA1, or three YDOAs on connectors JR1, JS1, and JT1. The fuses should be removed for isolated contact applications to ensure that suppression leakage is removed from the power bus.

Note Jumpers JP1-JP6 are removed in the factory and shipped in a plastic bag. Re-install the appropriate jumper if power to a field solenoid is required. Conduct individual loop energized checks as per standard practices, and install the jumpers as required.

3.8.3.2 TRLYS1D Relay Output with Servo Sensing

The Relay Output with servo sensing (TRLYS1D) terminal board holds six plug-in magnetic relays wired to a barrier type terminal block. The six relay circuits are Form-C contact outputs, powered and fused to drive external solenoids. A standard 24 V dc or 125 V dc source can be used. TRLYS1D supports a single YDOA on connector JA1, or three YDOAs on connectors JR1, JS1, and JT1.

3.8.3.3 TRLYS#F Relay Output with TMR Contact Voting

The Relay Output with TMR contact voting (TRLYS1F) terminal board provides 12 contact-voted relay outputs. TRLYS1F holds 12 sealed relays in each TMR section, for a total of 36 relays among three boards. The relay contacts from R, S, and T are combined to form a voted Form A normally open (NO) contact. 24/125 V dc or 115 V ac power can be applied. Three YDOA packs plug into the JR1, JS1, and JT1 37-pin D-type connectors on the terminal board. TRLYS#F does not have power distribution or support simplex systems.

Note TRLYS2F is the same as TRLYS1F except that voted contacts form a Form B normally closed (NC) output.

3.8.3.4 SRLY Simplex Relay Output

The Simplex Relay Output (SRLY) terminal board provides 12 form C relay contact outputs wired to a Euro-style box terminal block. Each of 12 sealed relays uses an isolated contact set for relay position feedback. The SRLY accepts a single YDOA, which can have one or two network connections.

3.8.3.5 SRSA Simplex Compact Digital Output

The Simplex Compact Digital Output (SRSA) terminal board provides 10 relay outputs, grouped as bank A and bank B. Each bank contains 5 outputs as a series combination of force-guided relay contacts and a solid-state relay. The primary disconnect operation should use the solid-state relays. The mechanical relays, one for each bank, are provided for redundancy and safety purposes.

3.8.4 YHRA HART Enabled Analog Input/Output

The Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) Enabled Analog Input/Output (YHRAS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. The YHRA holds up to 10 analog inputs, the first 8 of which can be configured as \pm 5 V or 4-20 mA inputs. The last two inputs can be configured as \pm 1 mA or 4-20 mA current inputs. It also supports two 4-20 mA outputs.

While in 4-20 mA mode, the YHRA can relay HART messages between HART enabled field devices and an Asset Management System (AMS). These HART enabled devices can be connected through any of the inputs or outputs.

HART signals are for monitoring purposes only, and must be configured as non-interfering.

YHRAS1A is compatible with the SHRA terminal board and is capable of single I/O pack operation only. Refer to *Appendix A* for detailed hardware and software configuration tables and checklists for Mark VIeS I/O packs and terminal boards. Use the checklists to cross-check the board configuration with the hardware topology.

For proper operation, the YHRA ToolboxST parameter AMS_Msg_Only must be set to disable.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.4.1 SHRA Simplex HART Enabled Analog Input/Output

The Simplex HART Enabled Analog Input/Output (SHRA) terminal board accepts 10 analog inputs and two analog outputs wired to a high-density Euro-block type terminal board. Connected to the YHRA pack, SHRA allows HART messages to pass between the YHRA and a HART enabled field device. The 10 analog inputs accommodate two-wire, three-wire, four-wire, or externally powered transmitters. The two analog outputs are 4-20 mA. SHRA accepts a single YHRA I/O pack.

3.8.5 YTCC Thermocouple Input

The Thermocouple Input (YTCCS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. YTCC handles up to 12 thermocouple inputs, while two packs can handle 24 inputs on TBTCS1C. Type E, J, K, S, and T thermocouples can be used, and they can be grounded or ungrounded. YTCC is compatible with the TBTC or the STTC terminal boards. In TMR configuration with the TBTCS1B terminal board, three packs are used with three cold junctions, but only 12 thermocouples are available.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.5.1 TBTC Thermocouple Input

The Thermocouple Input (TBTC) terminal board accepts up to 24 type E, J, K, S, or T thermocouple inputs wired to two barrier type terminal blocks and connects to the YTCC pack. TBTC works with the YTCC pack in simplex, dual, and TMR systems. In simplex systems two YTCC packs plug into the TBTCS1C for a total of 24 inputs. With TBTSH1B, one, two, or three YTCC packs plug-in to support a variety of system configurations, but only 12 inputs are available.

3.8.5.2 STCC Simplex Thermocouple Input

The Simplex Thermocouple Input (STTC) terminal board accepts 12 thermocouples wired to a Euro-block type terminal block, and connects to the YTCC pack. The on-board signal conditioning and cold junction reference is identical to those on the larger TBTC board. STCC is designed for DIN-rail or flat mounting and accepts a single YTCC I/O pack.

3.8.6 YVIB Vibration Input

3.8.6.1 YVIBS1A

The Vibration Input (YVIBS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. The pack handles up to 12 vibration inputs, the first 8 of which can be configured to read vibration or proximity inputs, channels 9-12 support proximeters only and channel 13 can input either a Keyphasor transducer or proximity-type signal. The terminal board also support non-safety rated buffered outputs of the input signal. The YVIBS1A I/O pack is rated SIL 1 with HFT of zero.

YVIBS1A is compatible with the TVBAS1A or TVBAS2A terminal board.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 1 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2)
- SIL 2 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3)

3.8.6.2 YVIBS1B

The Vibration Input (YVIBS1B) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a terminal board. the pack handles up to 13 inputs. The first 8 can be configured to read vibration or proximity sensors, channels 9-11 support position sensors only, and channels 12 and 13 can be configured to support either position sensors or KeyPhasor transducers. The terminal board also supports non-safety buffered outputs of the input signals. The YVIBS1B I/O pack is rated SIL 2 with HFT of zero.

YVIBS1B is compatible with the TVBAS1A or TVBAS2A terminal boards.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 our of 1, 2 out of 2)
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 our of 2, 2 out of 3)

3.8.6.3 TVBA Vibration Input

The Vibration Input (TVBA) terminal board provides 8 vibration inputs, 3 position inputs, an additional 2 position or Keyphasor inputs, and non-safety rated buffered outputs connected directly to two terminal blocks mounted on the board. Each block has 24 terminals that accept up to #12 AWG wires. A shield terminal attachment point is located adjacent to each terminal block. The TVBA can hold the following inputs and outputs:

- Vibration input Proximeters, Seismics, and Velomitor***** sensor channels 1-8; Accelerometers (channels 1, 2, and 3 only)
- Position inputs Proximeters channels 9-12 for YVIBS1A and channels 9-11 for YVIBS1B
- Keyphasor transducer input Proximiter sensor channel 13 for YVIBS1A and channels 12 & 13 for YVIBS1B
- Non-safety rated, buffered outputs of the inputs

The first eight inputs are jumper configured:

- Jumpers J1A through J8A
	- Seismic (S)
	- Prox or Accel (P, A)
	- − Velomitor sensor (V)
- Jumpers J1B through J8B
	- Prox, Velomitor sensor or Accel (P, V, A)
	- Seismic (S)
- Jumpers J1C through J8C
	- PCOM provides N28 return path for power
	- − OPEN no N28 return path through terminal board

3.8.6.4 WNPS Power Supply Daughterboard

Three redundant external power supplies provide the power for the TVBA. If one of the power supplies fails, the off line power supply can be replaced without bringing down the terminal board. To maintain this feature, the TVBA has three removable daughter cards to provide –28 to 28 V dc power converters. The daughter cards can be removed while the TVBA is online by disconnecting the I/O pack power (one at a time R, S or T), and removing the WNPS. The daughterboards are required to be mounted to meet all vibration and seismic standards.

3.8.7 YPRO Backup Turbine Protection

The Emergency Turbine Protection (YPROS1A) pack and associated terminal boards provide an independent backup overspeed protection system. They also provide an independent watchdog function for the primary control. A typical protection system consists of three TMR YPRO I/O packs mounted on separate SPRO terminal boards. A cable, with DC-37 connectors on each end, connects each SPRO to an emergency trip board, TREG. An alternate arrangement places three YPRO I/O packs directly on TREA for a single-board TMR protection system.

Mark VIeS control is designed with a primary and backup trip system that interacts at the trip terminal board level. Primary protection is provided with the YTUR pack operating a primary trip board (TRPG, TRPA). Backup protection is provided with the YPRO I/O pack operating a backup trip board (TREG, TREA).

YPRO accepts three speed signals, including basic overspeed, acceleration, deceleration, and hardware implemented overspeed. It monitors the operation of the primary control and can monitor the primary speed as a sign of normal operation. YPRO checks the status and operation of the selected trip board through a comprehensive set of feedback signals. The pack is fully independent of, and unaffected by, the controller operation. YPRO modules are complex in their configuration and operation and should only be installed and configured by qualified personnel familiar with turbine protection systems.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

In the ToolboxST application, when the YPRO variable *Speed1* is configured for either *StaleSpdEn* or *SpeedDifEn* (enabled), it must be connected to the controller's speed signal. An example is displayed in the following figure.

Connecting ContWdog and Speed1

For an additional LOP, YPRO expects a continuously updated output (*ContWdog*) from the controller. The variable *ContWdog Output* must be connected and programmed to be incremented each frame. If the value is not updated within five frames, YPRO generates a trip. This feature allows YPRO to independently verify that the application code continues to run in the controller.

Device_HB Block for ContWdog Counter

The YPRO I/O pack provides an additional LOP by monitoring the operating health of the system controller. The following rules apply if this protection is used:

- **Simplex main controller with TMR backup protection** is supported by all Mark VIeS backup trip boards (TREG and TREA). In this configuration, one port on each of three YPRO I/O packs connects to the controller IONet.
- **Dual Main Controllers with TMR backup protection** is supported by all Mark VIeS backup trip boards (TREG and TREA). This configuration uses the dual controller TMR output standard network connection. The first YPRO pack has one network port connected to the R IONet. The second pack has one network port connected to the S IONet. The third pack has one network port connected to the R IONet and one network port connected to the S IONet. The third YPRO monitors the operation of both controllers.
- **Triple Main Controllers with TMR backup protection** is supported when operating with a TMR main control (2 out of 3). All Mark VIeS backup trip boards (TREG and TREA) support this configuration. The network configuration connects the first YPRO pack to the R IONet, the second to the S IONet, and the third to the T IONet.

Note YPRO TMR applications do not support dual network connections for all three YPROs. In a redundant system there is no additional system reliability gained by adding network connections to the first two YPROs with dual controllers or any of the three YPROs with TMR controllers. The additional connections simply reduce mean time between failures (MTBF) without increasing mean time between forced outages (MTBFO).

3.8.7.1 TREA Turbine Emergency Trip

The Aeroderivative Turbine Emergency Trip (TREA) terminal board works with YPRO turbine I/O packs. The inputs and outputs are as follows:

- Nine passive pulse rate devices (three per $X/Y/Z$ section) sensing a toothed wheel to measure the turbine speed
- Jumper blocks that enable one set of three speed inputs to be fanned to all three YPRO I/O packs
- Two 24 V dc (S1A, S3A) or 125 V dc (S2A, S4A) TMR voted output contacts to trip the system
- Four 24 to 125 V dc voltage detection circuits for monitoring trip string

For TMR systems, signals fan out to the JX1, JY1, and JZ1 DC-62 YPRO connectors.

3.8.7.2 TREG Turbine Emergency Trip

The Gas Turbine Emergency Trip (TREG) terminal board provides power to three emergency trip solenoids and is controlled by the YPRO. Up to three trip solenoids can be connected between the TREG and TRPG terminal boards. TREG provides the positive side of the 125 V dc to the solenoids and TRPG provides the negative side. YPRO provides emergency overspeed protection, emergency stop functions, and controls the 12 relays on TREG, nine of which form three groups of three to vote the inputs controlling the three trip solenoids.

3.8.7.3 SPRO Emergency Protection

The Emergency Protection (SPRO) terminal board hosts a single YPRO pack. It conditions speed signal inputs for the YPRO and contains a pair of potential transformers (PTs) for bus and generator voltage input. The DC-37 pin connector adjacent to the YPRO pack connector links the SPRO with a Mark VIeS trip board.

3.8.8 YSIL Core Safety Protection

The Core Safety Protection (YSIL) I/O pack and associated terminal boards provide an independent backup overspeed protection system. They also provide an independent watchdog function for the primary control (Mark VIeS controller). A protection system consists of three TMR YSIL I/O packs mounted onto a TSCA terminal boards. Three serial cables connect from the TSCA to three SCSAs.

Mark VIeS control is designed with a primary and backup trip system that interacts at the trip terminal board level. Primary protection is provided with the YTUR pack operating a primary trip board (TRPG, TRPA). Backup protection is provided with the YSIL I/O pack operating emergency trip relays (ETRs) on the TRPA.

YSIL accepts 12 speed signals (probes), including basic overspeed, acceleration, deceleration, and hardware implemented overspeed. It monitors the operation of the primary control (Mark VIeS controller) and can monitor the primary speed as a sign of normal operation. YSIL checks the status and operation of TSCA through a comprehensive set of feedback signals. The I/O pack is fully independent of, and unaffected by, the Mark VIeS controller operation.

Note YSIL modules are complex in their configuration and operation and should only be installed and configured by qualified personnel familiar with turbine protection systems.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

In the ToolboxST application, when the YSIL variable *Speed1* is configured for either *StaleSpdEn* or *SpeedDifEn* (enabled), it must be connected to the controller's speed signal.

For an additional level of protection (LOP), YSIL expects a continuously updated output (*ContWdog*) from the controller. The variable *ContWdog Output* must be connected and programmed to be incremented each frame. If the value is not updated within five frames, YSIL generates a trip. This feature allows YSIL to independently verify that the application code continues to run in the controller.

Device_HB Block for ContWdog Counter

The YSIL I/O pack provides an additional LOP by monitoring the operating health of the system controller. The following rules apply if this protection is used:

- **Simplex main controller with TMR backup protection** is supported by the Mark VIeS backup trip board, TSCA. In this configuration, one port on each of three YSIL I/O packs connects to the controller IONet.
- **Dual Main Controllers with TMR backup protection** is supported by the Mark VIeS backup trip board, TSCA. This configuration uses the dual controller TMR output standard network connection. The first YSIL pack has one network port connected to the R IONet. The second pack has one network port connected to the S IONet. The third pack has one

network port connected to the R IONet and one network port connected to the S IONet. The third YSIL monitors the operation of both controllers.

• **Triple Main Controllers with TMR backup protection** is supported when operating with a TMR main control (2 out of 3). The Mark VIeS backup trip board, TSCA supports this configuration. The network configuration connects the first YPRO pack to the R IONet, the second to the S IONet, and the third to the T IONet.

Note YSIL TMR applications do not support dual network connections for all three YSILs. In a redundant system there is no additional system reliability gained by adding network connections to the first two YSILs with dual controllers or any of the three YSILs with TMR controllers. The additional connections simply reduce mean time between failures (MTBF) without increasing mean time between forced outages (MTBFO).

3.8.8.1 TCSA Turbine Emergency Trip

The TCSA uses the J2 connector to supply 125 V dc or 24 V dc power for ETRs 1-3 found on TB5 SOL1 & SOL2 and TB6 SOL3. Likewise, the J3 connector supplies power to ETRs 4-9 found on TB6 SOL4 - SOL9.

Under normal running conditions, the mechanical force-guided relay, K6 is energized and the ETRs 1,2 and/or 3 solid-state relays: ETR1-3 are energized. Similarly, the second mechanical force-guided relay, K7 is grouped with ETRs 4-6 and the third mechanical force-guided relay, K8 is grouped with ETRs 7-9. De-energizing any or all ETR(s) is considered a trip request.

3.8.8.2 SCSA I/O Expansion Board

The YSIL module requires three SCSA I/O expansion boards be connected through serial links to the TCSA terminal board. Each SCSA provides ten 4-20 mA inputs and ten 24 V dc transmitter power outputs, six 4-20 mA inputs for externally powered transmitters, three thermocouple inputs, three contact inputs, and three contact outputs. The YSIL can use any of the 4-20 mA analog inputs on the SCSA (AnalogInput01 R,S or T through AnalogInput16 R,S or T TMR input sets) in the Emergency Trip Relay (ETR) logic string.

3.8.9 YTUR Primary Turbine Protection

The Primary Turbine Protection (YTURS1A) pack provides the electrical interface between one or two IONets and a primary protection terminal board. YTUR plugs into the TTUR terminal board and handles four speed sensor inputs, bus and generator voltage inputs, shaft voltage and current signals, eight flame sensors, and outputs to the main breaker. Safety certified protection includes:

Speed An interface is provided for up to four passive, magnetic speed inputs with a frequency range of 2 to 20,000 Hz.

Flame Detection Voltage pulses above 2.5 V generate a logic high; the pulse rate is measured in a counter over a configurable time (multiple of 40 ms).

ETD TRPx contains relays for interface with the electrical trip devices (ETD).

Note For the Mark VIeS control, the flame sensing circuitry analysis was performed with the presence of flame considered as the safe state. YTUR flame sensing is not intended for applications where detected flame is the unsafe condition.

Only speed, flame detectors, ETD, and E-Stop circuits are certified for safety applications. All other functionality is non-safety rated.

YTURS1A is compatible with the TTUR and TRPA terminal boards. As an alternative to TTUR, three YTUR packs can be plugged directly into a TRPA terminal board. In this arrangement, TRPA holds four speed inputs per YTUR, or alternately fans the first four inputs to all three YTURs. TRPA provides two solid-state primary trip relays. This arrangement does not support bus and generator voltage inputs, shaft voltage or current signals, flame sensors, or main breaker output.

Note YTUR modules are complex in their configuration and operation, and should only be installed and configured by qualified personnel familiar with turbine protection systems.

SIL Capability:

- SIL 2 in HFT = 0 architectures (1 out of 1, 2 out of 2).
- SIL 3 in HFT = 1 architectures (1 out of 2, 2 out of 3).

3.8.9.1 TTUR Primary Turbine Protection Input

The Primary Turbine Protection Input (TTUR) terminal board works with the YTUR turbine I/O packs as part of the Mark VIeS control. Two barrier style terminal blocks accept the following inputs and outputs:

- Safety rated inputs and outputs:
	- Twelve pulse rate devices that sense a toothed wheel to measure turbine speed
	- Three overspeed trip signals to the trip board
- Non-safety rated inputs and outputs:
	- Generator voltage and bus voltage signals taken from PTs
	- 125 V dc output to the main breaker coil for automatic generator synchronizing
	- − Shaft voltage and current inputs to measure induced shaft voltage and current

In simplex systems, YTUR mounts on connector JR4 and cable connects to TRPG through connector PR3. For TMR systems, signals fan out to the PR3, PS3, and PT3. TTUR supports connection of TRPG and TRPA boards through the JR4, JS4, and JT4 connectors.

Note TTUR configuration information refers to non-safety-related functions.

3.8.9.2 TRPG Turbine Primary Trip

The Gas Turbine Primary Trip (TRPG) terminal board is controlled by the YTUR. On two barrier style terminal blocks, TRPG holds nine magnetic relays in three voting circuits to interface with three trip solenoids (ETDs). The TRPG works with TREG to form the primary and emergency interface to the ETDs. TRPG holds inputs from eight Geiger-Mueller® flame detectors for gas turbine applications. There are two board types:

- The S1A and S1B version for TMR applications with three voting relays per solenoid
- The S2A and S2B version for simplex applications with one relay per solenoid

In Mark VIeS systems, the TRPG is controlled by YTUR packs mounted on a TTUR terminal board. The I/O packs plug into the D-type connectors on TTUR, which is connected by cable to TRPG.

Note In a dual-control mode topology where (1 out of 2) or (2 out of 2) tripping is desired, use YTUR with an externally wired TRPGS2 terminal board for the desired configuration.

3.8.9.3 TRPA Turbine Primary Trip

The Aeroderivative Turbine Primary Trip (TRPA) terminal board works with the YTUR turbine I/O packs or with the TTUR terminal board as part of the Mark VIeS system. Both TRPAS1A and TRPAS2A are compatible with YTUR. TRPA holds the following inputs and outputs on two barrier style terminal blocks:

- Twelve passive pulse rate devices (four per R/S/T section) that sense a toothed wheel to measure the turbine speed. Or, six active pulse rate inputs (two per TMR section)
- One 24 to 125 V dc fail-safe E-Stop input to remove power from trip relays
- Two 24 V dc (S1) or 125 V dc (S2) TMR voted output contacts to the main breaker coil for trip coil
- Four 24 to 125 V dc voltage detection circuits for monitoring trip string

For TMR systems, signals fan out to the PR3, PS3, PT3, JR4, JS4, and JT4 connectors. TRPA can be configured to provide 12 independent pulse rate speed inputs with 4 per YTUR or fan a single set of 4 inputs to all 3 YTUR packs. Jumpers JP1 and JP2 select the fanning of the four R section passive speed pickups to the S and T section YTURs. Unused jumpers are stored on passive headers located on the corner of the board.

3.9 Power Sources

The Mark VIeS Safety control is designed to operate on a flexible selection of power sources. Power distribution modules (PDM) support the use of 115/230 Vac, 24 V dc, and 125 V dc power sources in many redundant combinations. The applied power is converted to 28 V dc for I/O pack operation. The controllers may operate from the 28 V dc I/O pack power or from direct 24 V dc battery power. Alternate power sources are acceptable if I/O pack power is regulated to be within ±5% of 28 V dc and overvoltage protection is provided by the power source. The extensive power feedback signals designed into the Mark VIe power distribution system are not critical to system safety but do provide useful information to assist in system maintenance.

All Mark VIeS I/O packs include a circuit breaker at the 28 V dc power input that limits the available fault current. The breaker also provides soft-start, permitting the application of power to an I/O pack without concern for other connected loads. All I/O packs monitor input voltage for undervoltage conditions. The voltage monitoring function provides alarms at 25.1 V dc (28 V -5%) and 16 V dc.

When the input voltage drops below 25.1 V dc, an alarm is generated. The I/O pack continues to operate, but performance is degraded. For example, on terminal boards with 24 V dc power sources for powered field devices, the voltage begins to drop below 24 V dc and the available drive voltage for analog output is diminished. Action should be taken to begin an orderly shut-down of equipment protected by the affected SIFs. I/O pack operation will continue to permit a controlled shutdown.

When the input voltage drops below 16 V dc, another alarm is generated. An output I/O pack enters its power-down state, the safe state for all but energize-to-trip SIFs. The following figures display an example of the power loss application in the ToolboxST application:

Input Variables

Output Variables

When designing de-energize-to-trip systems, the power circuits are not critical to safety because all failures are considered safe. This allows power systems with a single power distribution bus and supply to be used if it meets system running reliability requirements. For energize-to-trip systems, an interruption of all control power influences the ability to trip. To maintain an HFT of 1, three fully independent power supplies must be maintained for the redundant control electronics. The power distribution components available as part of the Mark VIe family provide the means to design a system with three separate control power distribution networks.

3.9.1 PPDA Power Distribution System Feedback

The PPDA I/O pack accepts inputs from up to six different power distribution boards. It conditions the board feedback signals and provides a dual-redundant Ethernet interface to the controllers. PPDA feedback is structured to be plug and play, using electronic IDs to determine the power distribution boards wired into it. This information then populates the IONet output to provide correct feedback from connected boards. For use with the Mark VIeS Safety controller, the PPDA I/O pack can be hosted by the JPDS, JPDC, or JPDM 28 V dc control power boards. It is compatible with the feedback signals created by JPDB, JPDE, and JPDF.

The PPDA I/O pack is not SIL-rated, and is authorized for use on a non-interfering basis for power system monitoring purposes only. PPDA feedback information cannot be used in a SIL-rated safety function.

Notes

4 Installation, Commissioning, and Operation

4.1 Installation

During installation, complete the following items:

- Documentation of a functional safety management plan, including:
	- − Organization and resources
	- Risk evaluation and management to identify safety hazards
	- − Safety planning, implementing, and monitoring
	- Functional safety assessment, auditing, and revisions
	- − System configuration management
- Clear documentation of the required hardware and programmable logic for each safety loop
- Safety function validation tests plans
- Functional testing of each safety loop conducted under site environmental conditions
- Records of functional tests

4.2 Commissioning

During commissioning, the following items should be checked:

- All wiring is in accordance with design
- All software and firmware is up-to-date
- Test instrumentation is calibrated
- No diagnostics are present in hardware or software
- System is properly configured (configuration checklist verified)
- Power supplies are of proper type and in good working order
- All forcing points are removed prior to engaging Locked mode

4.3 Operation

To maintain safety integrity during normal operations, the following checks and periodic proof tests must be conducted to expose any DU hazards.

- Proof test intervals must be calculated for each SIF
- Proof tests must be conducted to ensure that the functional safety as designed is maintained and test results recorded
- All diagnostic alarms must be identified and corrected. Check the front lights on the I/O pack when performing this task.
- Contact GE if a fault is encountered.

4.3.1 Variable Health

The Mark VIeS control detects I/O pack failures, defaults input data, and generates alarms as appropriate. The application code can be alerted to this type of failure by monitoring the health of critical input variables using the VAR_HEALTH block.

4.3.2 Alarming on Diagnostics

Alert an operator when a diagnostic alarm is active in the control system. Every pack and controller has a configuration variable *L3Diag* that is driven to the active state when there is an active diagnostic alarm in the device. Configure these variables as alarms in the application code so that they are available through the Alarm Viewer.

4.3.3 I/O Pack Status LEDs

During system operation, alarms or diagnostics must be promptly addressed. The following is a partial listing of I/O pack status LEDs.

A green LED labeled PWR indicates the presence of control power. A red LED labeled ATTN indicates five different pack conditions as follows:

- LED out -no detectable problems with the pack
- LED solid on $-$ a critical fault is present that prevents the pack from operating. Critical faults include detected hardware failures on the processor or acquisition boards, or no application code loaded.
- LED flashing quickly $(\frac{1}{4} \text{ second cycle})$ an alarm condition is present in the pack such as putting the wrong pack on the terminal board, or there is no terminal board, or there were errors loading the application code.
- LED flashing at medium speed $(3/4 \text{ second cycle})$ the pack is not online
- LED flashing slowly (two second cycle) the pack has received a request to flash the LED to draw attention to the pack. This is used during factory test or as an aid to confirm physical location against ToolboxST settings.

A green LED labeled LINK is provided for each Ethernet port to indicate that a valid Ethernet connection is present.

4.3.4 Restrictions

Restrictions in the Mark VIeS Safety control are as follows:

- The UCCCS05, UCSBS1A, and UCSCS2A are the only controller types certified for use in the Mark VIeS Safety control system.
	- − UCCCS05 is in maintenance mode only in Mark VIeS V05.03 beginning with ControlST V07.02
	- − UCSBS1A is supported beginning with ControlST V04.03 and higher
	- UCSCS2A is supported beginning with ControlST V07.02 and higher
	- UCCCS05
		- □ Does not support Modbus, and only supports 40, 80 and 160 ms frame periods
		- □ Compatible with all YxxxS1A and YxxxS1B I/O modules
	- UCSBS1A and UCSCS2A
		- □ Support both Modbus and the 10, 40, 80 and 160 ms frame periods
		- □ Compatible with all YxxxS1A I/O modules running at 40, 80 and 160 ms frame periods
		- \Box Compatible with all YxxxS1B I/O modules running at 10, 40, 80 and 160 ms frame periods
	- Frame idle time must be above 30%. Frame idle time should be periodic as the set of operations implemented in a frame is fixed for a given configuration. It can be monitored for a controller using the FrameIdleTime_x intrinsic variables on Trender or calculating a minimum using blockware. Frame idle time is calculated in the controller every frame.

Note To measure minimum frame idle time, measurements must be taken with all inputs healthy and separately with at least one input module unhealthy (for example, with the Ethernet cable removed from the I/O module). In most cases, the scenario with at least one input module unhealthy will have a lower frame idle time.

- − Average system idle time must be above 30%. System idle time is not periodic because of many features that are interrupt-based rather than frame based, such as UDH EGD consumption, communications with ToolboxST/HMI, and so forth. System idle time can be monitored for a controller using the IdleTime_x intrinsic variables on Trender and is calculated as a 1 second average. It is acceptable for measured system idle time to dip below 30%, but this must only occur less than 10% of the time.
- At frame periods of 40, 80 and 160 ms, any combination of the Safety I/O modules is allowed, up to a maximum of 50 modules per IONet
- At a frame period of 10 ms, any combination of Safety I/O modules is allowed such that all frame input clients complete within 1.6 ms after the start of the frame

Note 1.6 ms allows for a required 20% safety margin.

Execution time of the frame input clients varies based on the following user configurable items:

- Controller type
- Number of I/O modules
- Types of I/O modules
- Number of voted Boolean variables
- Number of voted Analog variables

For additional information, refer to the Appendix, *Determine Frame Input Client Completion Time*.

- Use only GE approved Ethernet switches in the Mark VIeS Safety control I/O network.
- The YHRA can be used for analog I/O requiring the HART communications interface. HART communications should be used for monitoring only and not for control.
- The analog outputs of the YHRA are NOT capable of hardware TMR voting and can only be applied as a simplex output. HART communications can be configured for simplex mode input only (no HART multi-drop support).
- The YHRA configuration parameter *AMS* Msg. Only must be set to disable.
- YVIBS1A is SIL 1 rated with an HFT of 0, SIL 2 with an HFT of 1.
- YVIB buffered outputs are not safety-certified.
- SRLY optional fused power distribution card WROx may only be used for power distribution, fuse diagnostic feedback signals are not safety certified.
- TRLY-F optional fused power distribution card WPDF may only be used for power distribution, fuse diagnostic feedback signals are not safety certified.
- IR interface to the I/O packs is prohibited while functioning as a safety control.
- The Mark VIeS Safety control allows communication with other controllers and Human-machine Interface (HMI) devices through the UDH protocol. The UDH communication channel is not safety-certified so any data accessed from UDH and used within a safety loop should be verified by the application code using appropriate measures. Commands from the HMI devices (for example setpoint changes) are not accepted by the Mark VIeS control.
- The presence of active diagnostic alarms in the control system indicates that safety functions may be compromised. All diagnostics should be cleared prior to startup and any diagnostic that occurs should be attended to in a timely fashion.
- Feedback values from the PPDA cannot be used for SIL-rated safety functionality. The PPDA is approved for non-interfering, power distribution system monitoring purposes only.
- The YTUR flame detection has been designed and analyzed with the safe state being the presence of flame. Flame sensing is not intended for applications where detected flame is the unsafe state.
- The master reset should be cleared before engaging safety control. The Master Reset command is issued by the controller to the I/O packs to reset any existing trips or suicide latches. If the fault condition remains after the reset has been issued, the trip or suicide is issued again. Because the I/O packs evaluate the Master Reset command at each run cycle, the I/O packs toggle between the cleared and faulted condition if the command remains active for an extended time and a persistent fault condition is present. To prevent this, the Master Reset command must be pulsed to the I/O packs and remain active for at least two frames before returning to the inactive state. The following figure displays the application code that implements this function.

Pulsed Master Reset
4.4 Product Life

During operation and maintenance, the following product life guidelines should be followed:

- The I/O packs have no known wear-out mechanism and do not require periodic maintenance.
- There are no wear items on the UCSBS1A or UCSCS2A controllers similar to the I/O packs.
- The terminal boards have no known wear-out mechanism and do not require periodic maintenance.
- The bulk 28 V dc power supplies have internal capacitors with finite life. Replacement of the power supplies should be scheduled every 15 years.
- The recommended Ethernet switches have internal power supply capacitors with finite life. Replacement of the switches should be scheduled every 15 years.
- Capacitor life predictions are based on an average ambient temperature of 35 $^{\circ}$ C (95 $^{\circ}$ F). Capacitor life is reduced by $\frac{1}{2}$ for every 10ºC (18 ºF) of average temperature above 35ºC (95 ºF).
- The cooling fan in the UCCC CPCI controller rack has a specified service life of 80,000 hours at 40 $^{\circ}$ C (104 $^{\circ}$ F). Replacement should be scheduled within this time period.
- The lithium battery for the UCCC has a service life of 10 years. The battery is disabled in stock and can be disabled when storing a controller. If it is desired to keep the local time-of-day clock operational through power interruptions, the Mark VIeS Safety controller battery should be replaced following the schedule below. This time-of-day is not critical to the safety function, and is overwritten by system time service in many applications. If the controller is stored with the battery disabled, its life expectancy is 10 years, minus the time the controller has been in service. If the controller is stored with the battery enabled, the life expectancy drops to seven years minus the time the controller has been in service.
- The power supply in the UCCC CPCI rack has internal capacitors with finite life. Replacement of the power supply should be scheduled every 15 years.
- The UCCC CPCI rack backplane has capacitor filtering with finite life. Replacement of the backplane should be scheduled every 15 years.

Notes

5 I/O Configuration

This chapter contains tables that should be used as checklists for I/O point configuration. Copies of each table should be made and the appropriate values either checked or written in the final column. The ToolboxST module configuration should be verified against the installed I/O module hardware.

➢ **To verify terminal board configuration**

- **1.** Upon initial installation, prior to securing the module cover, locate and record the terminal board information.
	- **a.** The terminal board part number contains the Type and Form information.

b. Record the terminal board barcode. This must be entered into the ToolboxST module configuration if offline or there is an ellipse that can automatically detect this ID if online.

5.1 YAIC

5.1.1 YAIC Compatibility

The YAIC I/O pack contains an internal processor board.

• The YAICS1A contains a BPPB processor board. This processor has a limited component lifecycle, with support up to firmware V04.06.

From the ToolboxSTapplication, do not upgrade YAICS1A to firmware above V04.06. YAICS1A is not supported in firmware V05.00 or later.

• The YAICS1B contains a BPPC processor board that is supported by firmware V05.01 or later with ControlST***** Software Suite V06.01 or later.

YAICS1A and YAICS1B I/O pack versions cannot be mixed on the same T-type terminal board.

All three YAIC I/O packs in a TMR set must be the same hardware form.

YAIC I/O pack is compatible with the TBAISIC and STAIS#A terminal boards.

- Simplex uses one I/O pack with one or two IONet connections.
- TMR uses three I/O packs with a separate IONet connection on each pack.

5.1.2 YAICS1B Configuration

5.1.2.1 Parameters

5.1.2.2 Inputs

5.1.2.3 Outputs

5.1.2.4 Variables

5.1.3 YAICS1A Configuration

The ToolboxST application configured items should be verified against the selected terminal board configuration.

YAIC Module

Parameters Tab **Configuration Description Select Option** \checkmark or Enter Value SystemLimits Enable or disable system limits Enable Disable Min_MA_Input Select minimum current for healthy 4-20 mA input 0 to 21 mA Max_MA_Input Select maximum current for healthy 4-20 mA input 0 to 21 mA

Input Tab (repeat for 10 inputs)

Input	Description	Select Option √ or Enter Value
InputType	Current or voltage input type	Unused 4-20 mA ±5V ±10V $±1$ mA (Inputs 9 and 10)
Low_Input	Value of current at the low end of scale	-10 to 20
Low_Value	Value of input in engineering units at low end of scale	$-3.4082 e + 038$ to $3.4028e + 038$
High_Input	Value of current at the high end of scale	-10 to 20
High_Value	Value of input in engineering units at high end of scale	$-3.4082 e + 038$ to $3.4028 e + 038$
InputFilter	Bandwidth of input signal filter	Unused 0.75 Hz 1.5 Hz 3.0 Hz 6.0 Hz 12.0 Hz
SysLim1Enabl	Input fault check	Enable Disable
SysLim1Latch	Input fault latch	Latch Unlatch
SysLim1Type	Input fault type	\geq \leq
SysLim1	Input limit in engineering units	$-3.4082 e + 038$ to $3.4028 e + 038$
SysLim2Enabl	Input fault check	Enable Disable
SysLim2Latch	Input fault latch	Latch Unlatch
SysLim2Type	Input fault type	2 \leq
SysLim2	Input limit in engineering Units	$-3.4082 e + 038 to$ $3.4028 e + 038$
DiagHighEnab	Enable high input limit diagnostic	Enable Disable
DiagLowEnab	Enable low input limit diagnostic	Enable Disable
TMRDiffLimt	Diagnostic limit, TMR input vote difference, in percent of (High_Value - Low_Value)	0 to 200 %

Analog Output Tab (repeat for 2 outputs)

Output	Description	Select Option √ or Enter Value
Output_MA	Type of output current, mA selection	Unused $0 - 20$ mA
OutputState	State of the outputs when offline	PwrDownMode Hold Last Value Output_Value
Output Value	Pre-determined value for the outputs	
Low_MA	Output mA at low value	0 to 20 mA
Low Value	Output in engineering units at low mA	-3.4082 e + 038 to $3.4028 e + 038$
High_MA	Output mA at high value	0 to 20 mA
High_Value	Output value in engineering units at high mA	-3.4082 e + 038 to $3.4028 e + 038$
TMRSuicide	Suicide for faulty output current, TMR only	Enable Disable
TMRSuicLimit	Suicide threshold for TMR operation	0 to 20 mA
D/AErrLimit	Difference between D/A reference and output, in % for suicide, TMR only	0 to 100 %
DitherAmpl	Dither % current of scaled output mA	0 to 10
Dither Freq	Dither rate in hertz	Unused 12.5 Hz 25.0 Hz 33.33 Hz 50.0 Hz 100.0 Hz

TBAI Terminal Board (continued)

STAI Terminal Board

STAI Terminal Board (continued)

5.2 YDIA

5.2.1 YDIA Compatibility

The YDIA I/O pack contains an internal processor board.

• The YDIAS1A contains a BPPB processor board. This processor has a limited component lifecycle, with support up to firmware V04.06 only.

From the ToolboxSTapplication, do not upgrade YDIAS1A to firmware above V04.06. YDIAS1A is not supported in firmware V05.00 and later.

• The YDIAS1B contains a BPPC processor board that is supported by firmware V05.01 or later with ControlST Software Suite version 6.01 or later.

YDIAS1A and YDIAS1B I/O pack versions cannot be mixed on the same T-type terminal board.

All YDIA I/O packs in a TMR or DUAL set must be the same hardware form.

The YDIA I/O pack is compatible with seven discrete contact input terminal boards, including the TBCI boards and STCI boards.

Module redundancy refers to the number of I/O packs used in a signal path, as follows:

- Simplex uses one I/O pack with one or two network connections.
- Dual uses two I/O packs with one network connection on each.
- TMR uses three I/O packs with one network connection on each.

YDIAS1B Configuration

5.2.2 Parameters

5.2.3 Inputs

5.2.4 Variables

Note The following variable names are displayed differently depending on redundancy of I/O pack (R, S, or T) and if this is a PDIA or YDIA pack.

5.2.5 YDIAS1A Configuration

Parameters Tab

Application Digital Input Tab (repeat for 24 inputs)

5.3 YDOA

5.3.1 YDOA Compatibility

The YDOA I/O pack contains an internal processor board.

• The YDOAS1A contains a BPPB processor board. This processor has a limited component lifecycle, with support up to firmware V04.11.

From the ToolboxSTapplication, do not upgrade YDOAS1A to firmware above V04.11. YDOAS1A is not supported in firmware V05.00 or later.

• The YDOAS1B contains a BPPC processor board that is supported by firmware V05.00 or later with ControlST***** Software Suite V06.01 or later.

YDOAS1A and YDOAS1B I/O pack versions cannot be mixed on the same T-type terminal board.

All three YDOA I/O packs in a TMR set must be the same hardware form.

YDOA is compatible with several types of discrete (relay) output terminal boards.

5.3.2 YDOA Configuration

YDOA Module

5.3.3 Inputs

5.3.4 Outputs

5.3.5 Variables

For public disclosure

5.4 YHRA

YHRA Module

Parameters Tab

Analog Input Tab (repeat for 10 inputs)

Analog Input Tab (repeat for 10 inputs) (continued)

Analog Output Tab (repeat for 2 outputs)

SHRA (JP1A – JP10A and JP1B – JP10B)

Circuit	Jumper	Select √
Input 1	J1A J1B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 2	J2A J2B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 3	J3A J3B	V dc 20 mA Open
Input 4	J4A J4B	Ret V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 5	J5A J5B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 6	J6A J6B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 7	J7A J7B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 8	J8A J8B	V dc 20 mA Open Ret
Input 9	J9A J9B	1 mA 20 mA Open Ret
Input 10	J10A J10B	1 mA 20 mA Open Ret

5.5.1 YTCC Configuration

5.5.1.1 YTCC Cold Junctions

Cold junctions are similar to thermocouples but without low pass filters.

5.5.1.2 YTCC Variables

I/O Points (Signals)

5.6 YVIB

5.6.1 YVIB Compatibility

There are currently two version of the I/O pack as follows:

- The YVIBS1A contains a BPPB processor board and two application boards. These internal boards have reached end of life.
- The YVIBS1B contains a BPPC processor board and a single application board. This I/O pack is supported with ControlST V06.01 or later. YVIBS1B supports an additional KeyPhasor input, a CDM input, and other Enhanced processing capabilities.

YVIBS1A and YVIBS1B cannot be mixed on a TMR module.

YVIBS1A is compatible with firmware versions up to V04.06.03C. Do NOTupgrade beyond this version.

If upgrading to YVIBS1B with an existing YVIBS1A configuration, use the ToolboxST application to correct the GAP12 configuration. Refer to the replacement procedure for detailed instructions.

For existing YVIBS1A applications after upgrading to YVIBS1B, the user may need to use the configurable low-pass filter to roll-off responses to match existing peak-to-peak calculations. This is because the YVIBS1B has an increased input signal bandwidth of 4500 Hz.

The following table provides a summary of compatibility for the YVIBS1A and YVIBS1B I/O pack versions.

The following table displays the available sensor types per channel with respect to the two different version of YVIB.

YVIB Supported Sensor Inputs

The YVIB I/O pack is compatible with the Vibration Terminal Board (TVBA) with simplex or TMR module redundancy.

YVIB and TVBA Compatibility

5.6.2 YVIBS1B Configuration

5.6.3 Component Editor

5.6.2.1 Parameters

5.6.2.2 Variables

5.6.2.3 Probe Nominal Settings

5.6.2.4 LM 1–3

 $[] =$ defaults

5.6.2.5 Vib1x 1-8

5.6.2.6 Vib2x 1-8

5.6.2.7 Vib 1-8

$[] =$ defaults

5.6.2.8 Gap 1-3

 $[$] = defaults

†is only valid with PVIBH1B or YVIBS1B

‡ LM Tracking Filter magnitude value may be inaccurate at 160, 320 ms frame periods.

5.6.2.9 Gap 4-8

$\left[\ \right] =$ defaults †is only valid with PVIBH1B or YVIBS1B

5.6.2.10 Gap 9-11

$[] =$ defaults

5.6.2.11 KPH

[] = defaults † is only valid with PVIBH1B or YVIBS1B

‡Gain 2x and Gain 8x are **Never** valid on GAP12_KPH2.

5.6.4 YVIBS1A Configuration

YVIB Module

Parameters Tab

Gap 1-3 Tab

Gap 1-3	Description	Setting
VIB_Type	Type of vibration probe	Unused PosProx VibProx VibProx-KPH VibLMAccel VibSeismic VibVelomitor
Scale	V/mil or V/ips	0 to 2
Scale_Off	Scale offset for Prox position only, in mils	0 to 1200
GnBiasOvride	Gain Bias Override	Enable Disable
Snsr_Offset	Amount of bias voltage (dc) to remove from input signal used to max. A/Ds signal range used only when GnBiasOvride is enabled	$±13.5$ V dc
Gain	Used only when GnBiasOvride = Enables and modifies the resolution of the incoming signal	1x 2x 4x 8x
LMIpcutoff	Tracking filter lowpass cutoff frequency in Hz	1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
TMR_DiffLmt	Difference Limit for Voted TMR Inputs in V or Mils	-1200 to 1200
SysLim1Enabl	Enable system limit 1 fault check	Disable Enable
SysLim1Latch	Latch system limit 1 fault	Latch Not Latch
SysLim1Type	System limit 1 - check type $(≥ or ≤)$	≥ \leq
SysLimit1	System limit 1 - gap in negative V (for Vel) or positive mils (for Prox)	-1200 to 1200
SysLim2Enabl	Enable system limit 2 fault check	Disable Enable
SysLim2Latch	Latch system limit 2 fault	Latch Not Latch
SysLim2Type	System limit 2 - check type (\ge or \le)	\geq ≤
SysLimit2	System limit 2 - gap in negative V (for Vel) or positive mils (for Prox)	-1200 to 1200

5.7 YPRO

YPRO Module

Parameters Tab

Parameters Tab (continued)

Pulse Rate Tab (3 each)

PT Input Tab (BUS and GEN)

E-stop (SPRO) Tab

E-stop Tab (TREA)

ETR Relays Tab (3 TREG, 2 TREA)

K4CL Tab

Econ Relays (3) Tab

Contacts (7) Tab

TREA

TREA Jumper

5.8 YSIL

5.8.1 YSIL Configuration

5.8.1.1 Parameters

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.2 Variables

5.8.1.3 Vars-Al Trip

5.8.1.4 Vars-Trip

5.8.1.5 Vars-Flame

5.8.1.6 Vars-Contacts

5.8.1.7 Vars-Speed

5.8.1.8 Vars-Relay

The following are the contact feedbacks for the electromechanical safety relays. They must be closed (feedback True) for current to flow in the ETRs.

The following are the Output Bits, which can be used to open ETR Relays. They are only available when the ETRs are configured as *Used* and TripMode configuration as *Enable* (from the *ETR Relay* tab).

Note When the relay outputs are configured as *TripMode* **Disable**, the associated mechanical relay will pick up when any of the three solid state relays pick up within that group, and drops when all the solid state relays are False in that group.

5.8.1.9 Vars-Sync

5.8.1.10 TSCA Contacts

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.11 EStop

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.12 ETR Relay

Default values are in blue.

Note [†] TripMode on ETR Relay can only be selected in groups. K4-K6 are in one group, and K7-K9 are in another group.

Note \ddagger When the relay outputs are configured as TripMode **Disable**, the associated mechanical relay will pick up when any of the three solid state relays pick up within that group, and drops when all the solid state relays are False in that group.

5.8.1.13 ETR Fdbk

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.14 TSCA Relay

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.15 TCSA Relay Fdbk

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.16 K25A

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.17 Pulse Rate

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.18 PT Inputs

The following PT inputs on the TCSA are fanned, single phase (75 to 130 V rms).

5.8.1.19 TCSA Analog Inputs

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.20 Flame

5.8.1.21 SCSA Analog Inputs

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.22 SCSA Thermocouple Inputs

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.23 SCSA Cold Junction

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.24 SCSA Relay

Default values are in blue.

5.8.1.25 SCSA Relay Fdbk

5.8.1.26 SCSA Contacts

Default values are in blue.

5.8.2 Asset Management System Tunnel Command

The Asset Management System (AMS) scans the HART-enabled field devices to determine health. This scan command decision is made in the AMS (not the I/O pack). The AMS can send scan commands over channels 1, 2, or 3. The YSIL I/O pack (or if using PHRA/YHRA) can be configured to either only allow for the scan command to occur on the default channel 3 or it can allow these scan commands to occur on any of the three channels (as determined by the AMS). By changing the parameter, *AMS_Mux_Scans_Permitted* to **Enable** (it is disabled by default), the I/O pack will accept a change from channel 3 (which is the default channel).

From the perspective of the AMS, the multiplexer is the I/O pack (YSIL, YHRA, or PHRA). † In electronics, a multiplexer (or mux) is a device that selects one of several analog or digital input signals and forwards the selected input into a single line.

5.9 YTUR

YTUR Module

Parameters Tab

Flame Tab

Flame Tab (continued)

Pulse Rate Tab (4 each)

Shunt V Tab

Shunt V Tab (continued)

Shunt C Tab

PT Tab (Gen and Bus)

PT Tab (Gen and Bus) (continued)

Circuit Breaker Tab

Relays Tab

E-Stop Tab

TTUR Jumper

TRPA (P1 and P2 jumpers)

TRPA Jumper

Notes

6 Proof Tests

Certain periodic proof tests must be satisfied to be eligible for IEC-61511 SIL certification. The testing schedule and resources are dependent on the designated proof test interval.

This test plan is to be used to validate SIL requirements for the Mark VIeS Safety Control during proof testing. Proof tests shall be conducted periodically to reveal any faults that may be undetected by system diagnostics during normal operation.

This test plan provides the following:

- Identifies the nature and extent of tests necessary to verify that the Mark VIeS Safety Control is fully compliant with SIL requirements
- Identifies equipment and describes test methodologies used to provide 99% proof test coverage

All test equipment must have up-to-date calibrations. Record the make, model, serial numbers, and calibration dates in the test record. The accuracy of measuring devices adds to the acceptance criteria.

Where possible, replace the terminal board field-wired terminal block with a test block to preserve field wiring with minimum disturbance.

These test procedures do not require configuration modifications to an existing SIS. Where system configurations are listed these are suggested configurations for test purposes. If the configuration does not match the system under test, either the test does not apply or the test results need to be adjusted.

Before each test, perform the following:

- Verify that no diagnostic alarms are present.
- Bypass any safety loop being tested or take other action to avoid an inadvertent trip.
- Check for inadvertent or unauthorized application changes by checking the *Branding Code* and compare with the application code recorded after commissioning or after the last authorized and verified change. Verify that the *Branding Code* matches the application code.

6.1 Proof Test Requirements

TMR and dual system configurations have automatic voting comparison diagnostics. This diagnostic provides random failure detection. The system and the voting diagnostics can be tested through the field device test procedure if field device test procedures include the following, and the alarm system has been checked to verify that no comparison diagnostics have been generated by the test.

For each safety loop when power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the comparison diagnostic should indicate a fault. When power that exceeds the hardware fault tolerance is removed from I/O packs, the system fails to its configured safe state, also for:

YAIC: Each analog sensor should be separately tested, one sensor at a time. Each test, if practicable, should range the sensor beyond the normal range of operation within the upper and lower limits of the sensors detectable range. Each output is tested when the output is ranged through a full range transition required to test the field device. When power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the system should maintain the required output.

YDIA: Each sensor should be tested causing a logical transition on the controller.

YDOA: Stimulate the safety function such that the output makes a transition. When power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the system should maintain the required output. Any output failures generate an error indication.

YHRA: Each analog sensor connected to an input should be tested separately. Each output is tested when the output is ranged through a full scale transition required to test the field device. The YHRA is a simplex only board, fault detection and failure modes are tested per the 61511 certified application code.

YTCC: Thermocouple inputs may be tested in place if an independent reference temperature is available to compare. Open TC detection can be tested by disconnecting one lead per TC at the terminal board screws. The cold junction temperature is tested by checking the temperature with the ToolboxST Cold Junction tab.

YVIB: Each sensor connected to an input should be separately tested, one sensor at a time (VibProx, VibProx-KPH, VibSiesmic, PosProx). Each test (if practicable) should range the sensor beyond the normal range of operation within the upper and lower limits of the sensors detectable range. Key Phasor* input accuracy can be tested in place if a reference speed is available to compare. When power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the system should maintain the required output.

YPRO: Speed inputs are tested when input signals are varied and compared to the reference signal. E-Stop and contact input interlocks are tested when actuated and ETRs are observed to drop out. When power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the system should maintain the required output.

YSIL: A feature enhanced version of the YPRO that includes Speed Inputs, E-Stop, ETR's, provisions for contact inputs, relay outputs, thermocouple inputs, and flame detectors.

YTUR: Speed inputs are tested when input signals are varied and compared to the reference signal. Flame detector (Gieger-Muller) inputs are tested when presence of flame is observed. E-Stop input is tested when actuated and PTRs are observed to drop out. When power (or the communications cable) is removed from one I/O pack in a hardware fault tolerant channel, the system should maintain the required output.

6.1.1 Simplex Systems

Simplex systems do not benefit from having comparison diagnostics between the redundant controllers. Therefore, functional testing is the most effective way to detect random failures within the controller.

6.2 YAIC/YHRA Test Procedures

6.2.1 Input Accuracy

General:

- Test the accuracy of the YAIC or YHRA pack analog inputs for the configured I/O pack
- Test out of range detection for the configured I/O pack

Test Setup:

- **1.** Obtain a multimeter and a signal source capable of generating current and voltages within the ranges of the configured YAIC pack.
- **2.** Confirm configured limits for 4-20 mA input types. If configured for ranges other than 4-20 mA, adjust the test limits accordingly.

Note Channels 9 and 10 only allow current input; do not test input voltage on these channels.

A set of test values are provided in the following table. Use only those test values associated with the configured I/O point. Configuration changes are not required.

Test Details:

- For the configured I/O, select the appropriate test values from the following table and apply them to the input.
- Document the value that the YAIC reads for each test value, as seen in the *Input* tab in the ToolboxST application.
- Perform the above tests for each configured input channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

- All measured values must be within 2% of the full range input values for the input accuracy test to be accepted.
- For out of range values using the ToolboxST application, confirm that the YAIC alerts the system that the input is out of range through the *Diagnostics* tab and that the channel goes unhealthy.

Test Values for Configuration Settings
6.2.2 Output Accuracy

General:

To test the accuracy of the YAIC pack analog outputs for the configured I/O packs.

Test Setup:

Connect a multimeter to the configured mA outputs.

Add a load to the output of approximately 250 Ω or meter in line with actual load device.

Test Details:

- **1.** Connect the first channel of the output of the YAIC pack to a multimeter capable of measuring voltage and current.
- **2.** Set the output of the pack to the first value in the following table. To set the output, go to the *Output* tab in the ToolboxST application and change the value of AnalogOutputxx.
- **3.** Record the measured output current (mA) reading for this channel and output level.
- **4.** Repeat steps 2 and 3 for each value in the following table.
- **5.** Repeat steps 1-4 above for all channels configured for mA outputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

All measured values must be within 2% of the expected output values for the accuracy test to be accepted.

Output Ranges to Test

6.2.3 YAIC Low Source Voltage

General:

The common source voltage for the analog input loop voltages for two-wire transmitters is monitored to detect low loop voltage and provide fault tolerance for this function when more than one I/O Processor is present.

Test Setup:

Connect a multimeter to any configured mA outputs of the YAIC as in the section *Output Accuracy*.

Test Details:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc Low Source Voltage power supply connection from the pack (for a TMR terminal board disconnect the power supply from two packs).
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy and that the outputs drop to 0 mA.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the pack's power removed, the pack should turn the inputs unhealthy and drop any configured output channels to 0 mA current.

6.3 YDIA Test Procedures

Items that are configurable in the YDIA pack are identified in this test plan by including (CFG) at the end of the name of the item. Any configurable items that must be set for a particular test are defined in the detailed test instructions below. If a setting is not given for a configurable item, then it is not relevant to that test.

Unless otherwise noted in the test plan, the tester should verify that there are no diagnostics faults on the YDIA pack under test prior to performing each test case.

Any diagnostic fault(s) that are expected to occur as a result of performing a test case will be detailed in the acceptance criteria for the test case.

If additional diagnostics faults are generated in the course of testing that are not detailed in the acceptance criteria, they must be fully explained prior to acceptance of the test.

The following tests can be performed in any order. Individual steps within a test should be performed in the order presented.

6.3.1 Digital Input Status

General:

This tests the following items that are configurable on each digital input from the ToolboxST application and verifies that the controllers can receive the input data.

- ContactInput(CFG) (Used/Unused)
- SignalInvert(CFG) (Normal/Invert)
- DiagVoteEnab(CFG) (Enable/Disable)

Test Setup:

Perform the appropriate test case on each of the inputs as they are configured.

Test Detail:

Test Case 1: Test Input Used and Normal

All inputs that are configured with

- ContactInput(CFG) = Used
- SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal
- DiagVoteEnab(CFG) = Enable
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *False*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)* and verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *True* and that there is no voting disagreement diagnostic.
- **3.** Check that there is no cross-interference by verifying that the status of all other inputs is *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *True*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *False*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

Test Case 2: Test Input Used and Invert

All inputs that are configured with

- $ContentInput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Invert$
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *True*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)*.
- **3.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *False*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *True*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

6.3.2 YDIA Low Source Voltage

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out of limits, and performs an orderly shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Detail:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack, in a TMR system disconnect the power connection from two packs.
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy (for loss of power on one pack of TMR look for disagreement diagnostic).

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is $\leq 16 \pm 1$ V dc, a diagnostic is generated, and all inputs go unhealthy.

6.4 YDOA Test Procedures

Items that are configurable in the YDOA pack are identified by including (CFG) at the end of the name of the item. Any configurable items that must be set for a particular test are defined in the detailed test instructions below. If a setting is not given for a configurable item, then it is not relevant to that test.

Unless otherwise noted in the test plan, the tester should verify that there are no diagnostics faults on the YDOA pack under test prior to performing each test case.

Any diagnostic fault(s) that are expected to occur as a result of performing a test case will be detailed in the acceptance criteria for the test case.

If additional diagnostics faults are generated in the course of testing that are not detailed in the acceptance criteria, they must be fully explained prior to acceptance of the test.

The following tests can be performed in any order. Individual steps within a test should be performed in the order presented.

6.4.1 Digital Output Control

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the Mark VIeS controller can control each output, that outputs are controlled through fault tolerant voting in TMR system, and that there is no cross-interference between outputs.

Relay actuation can be detected several ways:

- **1.** If the device controlled by the relay is safe to actuate it may be used to determine the relay output state.
- **2.** With wetting voltage applied the voltage at relay terminal board may be read.
- **3.** Remove any wetting voltage and read the relay contact path resistance.

For method two and three, removing the terminal board screw blocks and replacing them with test blocks is recommended. For method three, a voltage reading prior to the resistance reading is recommended for safety purposes.

Test Setup:

Perform the appropriate test based on configuration of each of the outputs.

Test Case 1: Test Output Used and Normal

For outputs configured with:

- $RelayOutput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal$
- **1.** All outputs should initially be turned off.
- **2.** Turn on the relay output.
- **3.** Verify that only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.
- **4.** Repeat for all configured relay outputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the output turned on in the controller, only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.

Test Case 2: Test Output Used and Invert

For outputs configured with:

- $RelayOutput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Invert$
- **1.** All outputs should initially be turned on.
- **2.** Turn off the output.
- **3.** Verify that only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.
- **4.** Repeat for all configured relay outputs

Acceptance Criteria:

With the output turned off in the controller, only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.

6.4.1.1 SRSA Digital Output Control

The SRSA uses the JF1 connector to supply 125 V dc or 24 V dc power across the Bank A positive power connections, PWRAx P and the power negative connections, PWRAx N where x is equal to 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Likewise, the JF2 connector supplies power to the Bank B positive power connections, PWRBy_P and the power negative connections, PWRBy_N where y is equal to 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

The user closes the normally open contacts (NOx) in Bank A by first closing the mechanical force-guided relay, K1 followed by the solid-state relay, Kx. Similarly, the normally open contacts (NOy) in Bank B are closed by commanding the K7 mechanical relay to close followed by the solid-state relay, Ky.

Test Case 1: Test Output Used and Normal

For outputs configured with:

- $RelayOutput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal$

All outputs should initially be turned off. Turn on the mechanical relay, K1 for Bank A or K7 for Bank B relay outputs. Turn on the Bank A solid-state relay, Kx where $x=2, 3, 4, 5$ or 6. Or turn on the Bank B solid-state relay, Ky where $y=8, 9, 10, 11$ or 12. Verify that only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized. Repeat for all configured relay outputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the output turned on in the controller, only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.

Test Case 2: Test Output Used and Invert

For outputs configured with:

- RelayOutput(CFG) = Used
- $Signallnvert(CFG) = Invert$

All outputs should initially be turned off. Turn on the mechanical relay, K1 for Bank A or K7 for Bank B relay outputs. Turn on Bank A's solid-state relay, Kx where $x=2, 3, 4, 5$ or 6. Or turn on Bank B's solid-state relay, Ky where $y=8, 9, 10, 11$ or 12. Verify that only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized. Repeat for all configured relay outputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the output turned on in the controller, only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.

6.4.2 Energized to Trip Applications

6.4.2.1 Relay Diagnostics for TRLYS1D

General:

This test verifies that the I/O pack is able to read feedback signals from the output circuits, to verify that outputs are in the correct state, and to generate diagnostic messages if they are not.

Test Setup:

This test is to be performed on the TRLYS1D with the following configurations as detailed below:

Test Case 1: Solenoid integrity on TRLYS1D (24 V dc)

Perform the following on all configured outputs.

- **1.** Using a YDOA/TRLYS1D combination, connect 24 V dc power to connector JF1 on the terminal board with configure outputs:
	- $RelayOutput(CFG) = Used$
	- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal$
- **2.** Connect a 0-250 Ω potentiometer across the NO and SOL terminals for the input under test; set the wiper to the middle of travel. All outputs should initially be turned off.
- **3.** Gradually decrease the potentiometer resistance until a diagnostic is generated indicating that there is a failure of the external solenoid.
- **4.** Disconnect the potentiometer and measure the resistance.
- **5.** Reset the wiper of the potentiometer to the middle of travel and reconnect it to the terminals for the output under test.
- **6.** Gradually increase the potentiometer resistance until a diagnostic indicates an external solenoid failure.
- **7.** Disconnect the potentiometer and measure the resistance.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the output is de-energized and the external resistance is below 7Ω , a diagnostic indicates solenoid failure. When the output is de-energized and the external resistance is above 200 $Ω$, a diagnostic indicates solenoid failure.

Test Case 2: Solenoid integrity on TRLYS1D (125 V dc)

Perform the following on all configured outputs.

- **1.** Connect 125 V dc power to connector JF1 on the terminal board with configure outputs:
	- $RelayOutput(CFG) = Used$
	- − SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal
- **2.** Connect a 0-5K Ω potentiometer across the NO and SOL terminals for the input under test; set the wiper to the middle of travel. All outputs should initially be turned off.
- **3.** Gradually decrease the potentiometer resistance until a diagnostic indicates an external solenoid failure.
- **4.** Disconnect the potentiometer and measure the resistance.
- **5.** Reset the potentiometer wiper to the middle of travel and reconnect it to the terminals for the output under test.
- **6.** Gradually increase the potentiometer resistance until a diagnostic indicates an external solenoid failure.
- **7.** Disconnect the potentiometer and measure the resistance.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the output is de-energized and the external resistance is below 122 Ω , a diagnostic is generated to indicate solenoid failure. When the output is de-energized and the external resistance is above 3250 Ω , a diagnostic indicates solenoid failure.

6.4.3 Low Source Voltage

General:

This test verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out-of-limits, and performs an orderly shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Details:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for TMR disconnect 28 V dc power supply connections to two packs).
- **2.** Confirm that all the outputs are in their safe state, display unhealthy, and a diagnostic is generated.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is $\leq 16 \pm 1$ V dc, a diagnostic is generated, and all outputs go to their fail-safe state and display unhealthy.

6.5 YTCC Test Procedures

For TBTC-mounted YTCCs, a terminal board test terminal block facilitates maintaining the field wiring while performing thermocouple tests. If a test terminal block cannot be used, remove each thermocouple (TC) connection for each TC test. Reconnect when finished.

6.5.1 TC Input Accuracy

When two or more thermocouples are in near proximity and are expected to measure the same ambient temperature, an alternative test is to record and compare the temperature profile as the thermocouples cool from operational temperature and converge to the same ambient temperature. This alternative test could take several hours for ambient temperature to stabilize.

General:

To test the accuracy of the YTCC pack for various thermocouple configurations.

Test Setup:

Obtain a mV signal source, capable of fractional mV signals.

Alternative:

Use a calibrated heat source or thermocouple test set.

Test Details:

- **1.** For the configured thermocouple, select the applicable thermocouple type from one of the following tables, *Type E Thermocouples*, *Type J Thermocouples*, *Type K Thermocouples*, *Type S Thermocouples*, or *Type T Thermocouples*.
- **2.** Read the Cold Junction temperature from the ToolboxST application Cold Junction tab.
- **3.** Look up the equivalent mV reading for the cold junction temperature under the table heading Cold Junction Compensation. Some interpolation is required.
- **4.** Select one of the mV values in the thermocouple table and inject a mV signal such that the sum of the cold junction mV values and the injected mV signal at the terminal board input equals one of the mV values in the mV column of the thermocouple table. The temperature reading for that thermocouple reading displayed in the ToolboxST application should be equal to the temperature in the table.
- **5.** Repeat step 4 for a second mV value in the thermocouple table.

Example:

For a type E thermocouple with a cold junction reading of 76.9 $\mathrm{^{\circ}F}$ (25 $\mathrm{^{\circ}C}$):

- **1.** In the table, *Type E Thermocouples*, for 76.9 °F (25°C) the cold junction mV compensation is 1.49 mV.
- **2.** Select 10 mV as a thermocouple test value.
- **3.** Inject a mV signal of $(10.0 1.5) = 8.5$ mV at the terminal board screws.
- **4.** The thermocouple should read 307 ± 5 °F (152.8 \pm -15 °C).

Acceptance Criteria:

All measured temperature signals should be within ± 5 °F (-15 °C) of the expected temperature for the input accuracy test to be accepted.

Type E Thermocouples

Type E Thermocouples (continued)

Type J Thermocouples

Type K Thermocouples

Type S Thermocouples

6.5.2 Open Thermocouple Inputs Detection

General:

This test demonstrates that the YTCC can successfully recognize when a thermocouple input becomes an open circuit.

Test Setup:

Short each configured thermocouple input from the positive to the negative terminal.

Test Details:

- **1.** From the ToolboxST application, confirm that each of the configured thermocouple channels temperature readings is approximately the same as the cold junction.
- **2.** Remove the short on the first channel to create an open circuit.
- **3.** From the Toolbox application, confirm that the pack generates a diagnostic due to the open circuit.
- **4.** Return the channel to a shorted condition.
- **5.** Repeat steps 2 through 4 for each configured channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

All channels properly generate a diagnostic when the circuit is opened.

6.5.3 TC Input Low Source Voltage

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Details:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for a TMR terminal board disconnect the power supply from two packs).
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the pack's power removed, the pack should turn the inputs unhealthy. Variables: PS18V_YTCC and PS28V_YTCC display *False* and *Unhealthy*.

6.6 YVIB Test Procedures

This test plan is designed for a generic configuration as described in each test detail section. Due to the large number of possible configurations for each signal type, some adjustment is necessary in the expected results if the configuration is different from the generic type. It is not necessary to alter the configuration to conduct this test plan but results may vary based on configuration.

6.6.1 Vibration (VibProx, VibProx-KPH) Input Accuracy

General:

This test checks the accuracy of the YVIB vibration configured as VibProx, VibProx-KPH.

Test Setup:

Obtain a function generator capable of sinusoid signals of 10 V dc pp and \pm 5 V dc offsets.

To preserve field wiring, remove the wired terminal block and replace it with a test block for the following set of tests. Replace the field wired terminal block when testing is complete.

Test Details:

IS200TVBAS1A/S2A Vibration Terminal Board

Note Darkened box indicates proper jumper settings.

For each of the configure channels 1-8 configured for vibration inputs, the following generic configuration is assumed:

If the vibration inputs under test are configured differently from the settings listed above, the input signal or results should be adjusted to conform to the actual configuration. For example, if a high pass filter is employed, then the test signal frequency should be within the high pass frequency filter band.

In this test a 6 V dc pp with a –5 V dc offset will be read as a 60 mil vibration with a 50 mil gap.

Alternative:

Use a shaker table connected to vibration sensor to provide a reference input signal.

- **1.** Configure the signal source to apply a 50 Hz sine wave (6 V dc pp) with a dc offset of –5 V dc.
- **2.** Document the value that the YVIB reads for each value, as seen in I/O Live Value in the **Vib 1-8** tab. The first input channel will be called *VIB1*. The nominal value should be 60 mils.
- **3.** Document the value that the YVIB reads for each value, as seen in I/O Live Value in the **Gap 1-3** tab. The first input channel will be called *GAP1_VIB1*. The nominal value should be 50.
- **4.** Document the value that the YVIB reads for each value, as seen in I/O Live Value in the **Gap 4-8** tab. The first input channel will be called *GAP4_VIB4*. The nominal value should be 50.
- **5.** Increase the signal frequency to 700 Hz.
- **6.** Repeat steps 3, 4, and 5 for all vibration inputs configured as VibProx or VibProx-KPH.

Acceptance Criteria:

For Vibration signals (VIB1-8) 5-200 Hz 1% at 3 V dc pp (\pm 0.03 V dc) or \pm 0.3 mils scaled to 0.1 V dc/mil.

For Vibration signals (VIB1-8) 200-700 Hz 5% at 3 V dc pp $(\pm 0.15 \text{ V}$ dc) or ± 1.5 mils scaled to 0.1 V dc/mil.

For Gap signal (GAP1_VIB1-GAP8_VIB8) 1% FS (\pm 0.2 V dc) or \pm 2.0 mils scaled to 0.1 V dc/mil.

6.6.2 Vibration (VibSeismic) Input Accuracy

General:

This test checks the accuracy of the YVIB vibration configured as VibSeismic inputs.

Test Setup:

Obtain a function generator capable of sinusoid signals of 10 V dc pp.

To preserve field wiring, remove the wired terminal block and replace it with a test block for the following set of tests. Replace the field wired terminal block when testing is complete.

Test Details:

IS200TVBAS1A/S2A Vibration Terminal Board

Note Darkened box indicates proper jumper settings.

If the Gap inputs under test are configured differently from the settings listed in the previous figure, the input signal or results should be adjusted to conform to the actual configuration. For example if the scale were configured to 0.2 V dc, then the live value would be ½ the expected value.

In this test, a 1.5 V dc pp with a 0 V dc offset will be read as a 7.5 mil vibration

- **1.** Configure the signal source to apply a 50 Hz sine wave (1.5 V dc pp) with a 0 V dc offset.
- **2.** Document the value that the YVIB reads as seen in I/O Live Value in the **Vib 1-8** tab. The nominal value should be 7.5 mils.
- **3.** Repeat step 2 for all vibration inputs configured as VibSeismic.
- **4.** Increase the signal frequency to 330 Hz.
- **5.** Repeat step 2 for all vibration inputs configured as VibSeismic.

Acceptance Criteria:

Vibration seismic readings are accurate within 0.2 mils at 50 Hz and 0.5 mils at 660 Hz.

6.6.3 Position Proximeter (PosProx) Accuracy

This test checks the accuracy of the YVIB configured position proximeter inputs.

General Requirement Descriptions:

- The vibration input module provides 4 channels of signal conditioning for field wired position inputs.
- The analog input function can be configurable by the controller over IONet communications.

Test Setup:

Obtain a signal source capable of providing a dc signal of -1 to -9 V dc.

To preserve field wiring, remove the wired terminal block and replace it with a test block for the following set of tests. Replace the field wired terminal block when testing is complete.

Test Details:

This test is to be performed on the following terminal boards:

IS200TVBAS1A/S2A Vibration Terminal Board

Note Darkened box indicates proper jumper settings.

If the Gap inputs under test are configured differently from the settings listed above, the input signal or results should be adjusted to conform to the actual configuration. For example if the scale were configured to 0.2 V dc then the live value would be ½ the expected value.

In this test a -1.75 V dc offset will be read as a 17.5 mil gap

- **1.** For channels configured for PosProx.
- **2.** Apply a -1.75 V dc signal to input channels 9 –12.
- **3.** Document the value that the YVIB reads for each channel as seen in I/O Live Value in the **Gap 4-8** and **Gap 9-12** tabs. Nominal value is 17.5 mils.
- **4.** Vary the displacement (gap) signal between -0.5 and -9.0 V dc. Gap readings should vary from 5 90 mils.

Acceptance Criteria:

All measured values must be within ± 2.0 mils scaled 0.1 V dc.

Note The *Open Circuit Detection* test can be conducted simultaneously with this test for PosProx configured channels.

6.6.4 Keyphasor Transducer Accuracy

This test checks the accuracy of the YVIB position Keyphasor transducer input.

General:

The vibration input module provides a channel for field wired Keyphasor transducer position input.

Test Setup:

To preserve field wiring, remove the wired terminal block and replace it with a test block for the following set of tests. Replace the field wired terminal block when testing is complete.

Test Details:

This test is to be performed on the following terminal boards:

IS200TVBAS1A/S2A Vibration Terminal Board

Note Darkened box indicates proper jumper settings.

For YVIBS1A channel 13 or YVIBS1B channels 12 and 13 configured for Keyphasor transducer input:

- **1.** Apply a 50 Hz pulse waveform with offset -5 V dc, 4 V dc pp, and a high side duty cycle > 55% to appropriate KeyPhasor channel(s).
- **2.** If using YVIBS1A, document the value that the YVIBS1A reads for channel 13 from variable RPM_KPH1. Nominal value is 3000 rpm.
- **3.** If using YVIBS1B, document the revolutions per minute YVIBS1B reads for channels 12 and 13 from the variables, RPM_KPH1 and RPM_KPH2. Nominal value is 3000 rpm.

Note A square wave has a 50% duty cycle and will not function.

Acceptance Criteria:

All measured values must be within ±20.0 rpm.

6.6.5 Open Circuit Detection

General:

Test the vibration input function open circuit detection for Proximity, Accelerometer and Velomitor sensor mode of operation.

Test Setup:

To preserve field wiring, remove the wired terminal block and replace it with a test block for the following set of tests. Replace the field wired terminal block when testing is complete.

IS200TVBAS1A/S2A Vibration Terminal Board

Note Darkened box indicates proper jumper settings.

Test Details:

Test Case 1: PosProx

- **1.** For all inputs configured as position PosProx.
- **2.** Apply a -5.0 V dc signal to the input.
- **3.** Verify no diagnostic alarms for connected channels.
- **4.** Open the input connection to all configured inputs.
- **5.** Verify *Out of Limits or Saturated* and/or *Open Circuit* diagnostic alarm for all channels.

Test Case 2: VibLMAccel

- **1.** For all inputs configured as VibLMAccel.
- **2.** Apply a -9.0 V dc signal.
- **3.** Verify no diagnostic alarms for connected channels.
- **4.** Open the input connections to the VibLMAccel configured channels.
- **5.** Verify *Out of Limits or Saturated* and/or *Open Circuit* diagnostic alarms for the channels.

Test Case 3: VibVelomitor

- **1.** For all inputs configured as VibVelomitor.
- **2.** Do not apply a test voltage to the inputs.
- **3.** Open the input connection to the VibVelomitor channels.
- **4.** Verify *Out of Limits or Saturated* and/or *Open Circuit* diagnostic alarm.

Acceptance Criteria:

Pack must be able to detect open circuit conditions and generate a diagnostic.

6.6.6 Low Source Voltage

General:

The common source voltage for the analog input loop voltages for two wire transmitters shall be monitored to detect low loop voltage and provide fault tolerance for this function when more than one I/O processor is present.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Details:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for a TMR terminal board disconnect the power supply from two packs).
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the pack's power removed, the pack should turn the inputs unhealthy. PS28V_YVIB and PS18V_YVIB values goes to *False* and *Unhealthy*.

6.7 YPRO Test Procedures

Items that are configurable in the YPRO I/O pack are identified in this test plan by including (CFG) at the end of the name of the item. Any configurable items that must be set for a particular test are defined in the detailed test instructions below. If a setting is not given for a configurable item, it is not relevant to that test.

Unless otherwise noted in the test plan, the tester should verify that there are no diagnostics faults on the YPRO under test prior to performing each test case. Any diagnostic fault(s) expected to occur as a result of performing a test case are detailed in the acceptance criteria for the test case.

If additional diagnostics faults are generated in the course of testing that are not detailed in the acceptance criteria, they must be fully explained prior to acceptance of the test. The following tests can be performed in any order. Individual steps within a test should be performed in the order presented.

6.7.1 Contact Input Trip Tests

General:

This test verifies action of the contact input trips including trip logic in YPRO firmware.

Test Setup:

Select the Test Case below according to configuration of the Contact Inputs.

Test Detail:

These tests are relevant for TREG terminal boards.

Test Case 1: TripMode: Direct Trip (CFG)

1. Energize Contact Input and reset trip relays

- **a.** Close contacts on E-stop button or connect a jumper across E-TRP (H) and TRP (L).
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YPRO such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the contact input.

Acceptance criteria:

Controllers correctly read status of contact input.

2. Initiate trip

- **a.** Open the contact input to generate a trip.
- **b.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the contact input.

Acceptance criteria:

The controllers correctly read the status of the contact input and a diagnostic alarm message is generated indicating that the YPRO has tripped.

3. Confirm trip cannot be reset

Attempt to reset the trip by turning on the MasterReset output in the controller and confirm that the trip cannot be cleared with a reset as long as the contact remains open.

Acceptance criteria:.

The ETRs remain open and the diagnostic alarm message is generated indicating that the YPRO has tripped.

Test Case 2: TripMode: Conditional Trip (CFG)

1. Test Conditional Trip – Negative

- **a.** Close contacts on E-stop button or connect a jumper to energize the contact input.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YPRO such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** In the controller Vars-CI tab, set the value of trip#_inhibit to *True*.
- **d.** Open E-stop button or remove the jumper from the contact input and confirm that the contact input does not cause a trip.

Acceptance criteria:

Contact input does not cause trip when inhibit signal is *True*.

2. Test Conditional Trip – Positive

- **a.** Close contacts on E-stop button or connect a jumper to energize the contact input.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YPRO such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** In the controller Vars-CI tab, set the value of trip#_inhibit to *False*.
- **d.** Open E-stop button or remove the jumper from the contact input and confirm that the contact input does cause a trip.

Acceptance criteria:

Contact input causes trip when inhibit signal is *False*.

6.7.2 E-Stop Test

General:

This test verifies the E-stop trip logic in YPRO.

Test Setup:

These tests are relevant for TREG and TREA terminal boards.

Test Case 1: E-stop on TREG terminal board

1. Energize E-stop Input and reset trip relays

- **a.** Place E-stop button in run position.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YPRO such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

The trip relays reset to the running condition and all controllers correctly read status of contact input.

2. Initiate trip

- **a.** Press the E-stop button.
- **b.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

YPRO commands the trip relays to open all trip relay circuits, and the controllers correctly read the status of the E-stop input and a LED indication on the pack is generated indicating that the YPRO has tripped due to an E-stop.

Test Case 2: E-stop on TREA terminal board

1. Energize E-stop Input and reset trip relays

- **a.** Place E-stop button in run position.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YPRO such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

The trip relays reset to the running condition and all controllers correctly read status of L5ESTOP1_Fdbk = *True*, and all controllers read the status of L5ESTOP1 = *False*.

2. Initiate trip

- **a.** Press the E-stop button.
- **b.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

All three trip relays open with contact de-energization and the controllers correctly read the status of the contact input.

6.7.3 Speed Inputs Accuracy

General:

Simultaneously check characteristics of speed inputs (range, accuracy) and verifies that YPRO/SPRO/TREA support applications by allowing speed inputs to be sent to the controllers without cross-interference.

Alternative Accuracy Test:

Compare YPRO speed signal at several different operating points with basic process control system (BPCS) speed signals.

Test Setup:

1. Connect an oscilloscope to the speed sensor terminal board inputs to measure the pulse rates from the speed pickups

Or

2. Disconnect the speed sensor inputs and configure a function generator for a 9 V dc pp sine wave output with zero offset to provide a reference speed signal to the pulse rate inputs.

Speed Input Accuracy

Perform the following on all configured pulse rate inputs. For at least 2 speeds in the range of 2 to 20,000 Hz, apply a speed signal and record the value of speed reported by the controller.

- **1.** Verify that the channel being stimulated reads the correct value of speed and that all inputs that are not being stimulated read 0.
- **2.** Repeat for each configured pulse rate inputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

The speed Input function will have < a 1% deviation between the actual steady state field signal and the reported value.

- Each channel reads the correct value of speed when stimulated.
- All inputs that are not being stimulated read zero.
- There should be no diagnostics.

6.7.4 Overspeed Test

General:

The purpose of the overspeed test is to confirm an overspeed condition is properly detected and to exercise the emergency trip relays (ETR). Periodic testing that performs this function will meet the proof test requirements for this safety function. The following test procedure provides a method to perform this functional test.

Test Setup:

This test procedure uses one function generator output; FG1. For each test step, connect the function generator to the inputs indicated in the following figure. Configure the function generator output for square wave output, 9 V dc pp, 0 V dc offset.

Function Generator Inputs

Some function generators introduce large frequency deviations while incrementing in frequency, these deviations may cause an acceleration or deceleration trip if the I/O pack is configured for accl/decl trips.

Test Detail:

Unless otherwise noted, perform a MasterReset after each step that results in a trip.

Firmware Overspeed Trip OS_Setpoint

- **1.** Connect FG1 to the first configured pulse rate input. Ramp the frequency of FG1 up until the YPRO trips. Record the signal on the pulse rate input and the status of the output contacts.
- **2.** Attempt to reset the overspeed fault by sending a MasterReset from the controller.
- **3.** Reduce frequency to below trip point and send a MasterReset.
- **4.** Repeat for all configured pulse rate inputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

- The ETR contacts open when the frequency of FG1 reaches the value of OS_Setpoint(CFG), and a diagnostic is generated indicating that an overspeed trip occurred, and the controller input signal ComposTrip1 = *True.*
- Overspeed fault cannot be reset as long as the pulse rate signal is above the value of OS_Setpoint(CFG).
- ➢ **To perform the hardware overspeed trip on HWOS_Setpoint test**
- **1.** Configure the firmware overspeed setpoint, OS_Setpoint(CFG) (*Pulse Rate* tab), to a speed greater than the hardware overspeed setpoint.
- **2.** Download the firmware overspeed setpoint. An overspeed [] firmware setpoint configuration error diagnostic occurs, to clear the diagnostic set the OSn_Setpoint (*Vars-Speed* tab) to match the configuration value OS_Setpoint (*Pulse Rate* tab).
- **3.** Connect FG1 to the first configured pulse rate input pair. Ramp the frequency of FG1 up until the PPRO trips. Record the signal on the pulse rate input and the status of the output contacts.
- **4.** Attempt to reset the overspeed fault by sending a MasterReset from the controller.
- **5.** Reduce frequency to significantly (at least 10%) below trip point and send a MasterReset.
- **6.** Repeat for all configured pulse rate input pairs.
- **7.** Restore the firmware, OS_Setpoint(CFG) (*Pulse Rate* tab), and signal space firmware overspeed setpoint, OSn_Setpoint (*Vars-Speed* tab), to their original value.

Acceptance Criteria:

- The ETR contacts open when the frequency of FG1 reaches the value of HWOS_Setpoint(CFG), and a diagnostic indicates that an overspeed trip occurred, and the controller input signal ComposTrip1 = *True*
- Overspeed fault cannot be reset as long as the pulse rate signal is above the value of HWOS_Setpoint(CFG).

6.7.5 Low Source Voltage

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out of limits, and performs a shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Case:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for TMR disconnect two 28 V dc power supply connections).
- **2.** Confirm that all the outputs are in their safe state, display unhealthy and a diagnostic is generated.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is < 16 V dc, a diagnostic is generated, all outputs go to their safe state and display unhealthy. Variables: PS18V_YPRO_/R/S/T and PS28V_YPRO_/R/S/T display *False* and *Unhealthy*.

6.8 YSIL Test Procedures

Items that are configurable in the YSIL I/O pack are identified in this test plan by including (CFG) at the end of the name of the item. Any configurable items that must be set for a particular test are defined in the detailed test instructions below. If a setting is not given for a configurable item, it is not relevant to that test.

Unless otherwise noted in the test plan, the tester should verify that there are no diagnostics faults on the YSIL under test prior to performing each test case. Any diagnostic fault(s) expected to occur as a result of performing a test case are detailed in the acceptance criteria for the test case.

If additional diagnostics faults are generated in the course of testing that are not detailed in the acceptance criteria, they must be fully explained prior to acceptance of the test. The following tests can be performed in any order. Individual steps within a test should be performed in the order presented.

6.8.1 E-Stop Test

General:

This test verifies the E-Stop trip logic in YSIL.

Test Setup:

These tests are relevant for TCSA terminal board.

These tests can move valves take precautions or use bypass procedures.

Test Case 1: E-Stop on TCSA terminal board

1. Energize E-Stop Input and reset trip relays

- **a.** Place E-Stop button in run position.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YSIL such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up. If configured as ETR, then ETR4–6 and ETR 7–9.
- **c.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-Stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

The trip relays reset to the running condition and all controllers correctly read status of contact input.

- **2. Initiate trip**
	- **a.** Press the E-Stop button.
	- **b.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the E-Stop input (L5ESTOP1).

Acceptance criteria:

YSIL commands the trip relays to open all trip relay circuits, and the controllers correctly read the status of the E-Stop input and a LED indication on the pack is generated indicating that the YSIL has tripped due to an E-Stop.

6.8.2 Speed Inputs Accuracy

General:

Simultaneously check characteristics of speed inputs (range, accuracy) and verifies that YSIL/TCSA support applications by allowing speed inputs to be sent to the controllers without cross-interference.

Alternative Accuracy Test:

Compare YSIL speed signal at several different operating points with basic process control system (BPCS) speed signals.

Test Setup:

1. Connect an oscilloscope to the speed sensor terminal board inputs to measure the pulse rates from the speed pickups

Or

2. Disconnect the speed sensor inputs and configure a function generator for a 9 V dc pp sine wave output with zero offset to provide a reference speed signal to the pulse rate inputs.

Speed Input Accuracy

Perform the following on all configured pulse rate inputs. For at least 2 speeds in the range of 2 to 20,000 Hz, apply a speed signal and record the value of speed reported by the controller.

- **1.** Verify that the channel being stimulated reads the correct value of speed and that all inputs that are not being stimulated read 0.
- **2.** Repeat for each configured pulse rate inputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

The speed Input function will have $\lt a$ 1% deviation between the actual steady state field signal and the reported value.

- Each channel reads the correct value of speed when stimulated.
- All inputs that are not being stimulated read zero.
- There should be no diagnostics.

6.8.3 Overspeed Test

General:

The purpose of the overspeed test is to confirm an overspeed condition is properly detected and to exercise the emergency trip relays (ETR). Periodic testing that performs this function will meet the proof test requirements for this safety function. The following test procedure provides a method to perform this functional test.

Test Setup:

This test procedure uses one function generator output; FG1. For each test step, connect the function generator to the inputs indicated in the following figure. Configure the function generator output for square wave output, 9 V dc pp, 0 V dc offset.

Function Generator Inputs

Some function generators introduce large frequency deviations while incrementing in frequency, these deviations may cause an acceleration or deceleration trip if the I/O pack is configured for accl/decl trips.

Test Detail:

Unless otherwise noted, perform a MasterReset after each step that results in a trip.

Firmware Overspeed Trip OS_Setpoint

- **1.** Connect FG1 to the first configured pulse rate input. Ramp the frequency of FG1 up until the YSIL trips. Record the signal on the pulse rate input and the status of the output contacts.
- **2.** Attempt to reset the overspeed fault by sending a MasterReset from the controller.
- **3.** Reduce frequency to below trip point and send a MasterReset.
- **4.** Repeat for all configured pulse rate inputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

- The ETR contacts open when the frequency of FG1 reaches the value of OS_Setpoint(CFG), and a diagnostic is generated indicating that an overspeed trip occurred, and the controller input signal ComposTrip1 = *True.*
- Overspeed fault cannot be reset as long as the pulse rate signal is above the value of OS_Setpoint(CFG).

➢ **To perform the hardware overspeed trip on HWOS_Setpoint test**

- **1.** Configure the firmware overspeed setpoint, OS_Setpoint(CFG) (*Pulse Rate* tab), to a speed greater than the hardware overspeed setpoint.
- **2.** Download the firmware overspeed setpoint. An overspeed [] firmware setpoint configuration error diagnostic occurs, to clear the diagnostic set the OSn_Setpoint (*Vars-Speed* tab) to match the configuration value OS_Setpoint (*Pulse Rate* tab).
- **3.** Connect FG1 to the first configured pulse rate input pair. Ramp the frequency of FG1 up until the YSIL trips. Record the signal on the pulse rate input and the status of the output contacts.
- **4.** Attempt to reset the overspeed fault by sending a MasterReset from the controller.
- **5.** Reduce frequency to significantly (at least 10%) below trip point and send a MasterReset.
- **6.** Repeat for all configured pulse rate input pairs.
- **7.** Restore the firmware, OS_Setpoint(CFG) (*Pulse Rate* tab), and signal space firmware overspeed setpoint, OSn_Setpoint (*Vars-Speed* tab), to their original value.

Acceptance Criteria:

- The ETR contacts open when the frequency of FG1 reaches the value of HWOS Setpoint(CFG), and a diagnostic indicates that an overspeed trip occurred, and the controller input signal ComposTrip1 = *True*
- Overspeed fault cannot be reset as long as the pulse rate signal is above the value of HWOS_Setpoint(CFG).

6.8.4 Low Source Voltage

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out of limits, and performs a shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Case:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for TMR disconnect two 28 V dc power supply connections).
- **2.** Confirm that all the outputs are in their safe state, display unhealthy and a diagnostic is generated.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is < 16 V dc, a diagnostic is generated, all outputs go to their safe state and display unhealthy. Variables: PS18V_YSIL_/R/S/T and PS28V_YSIL_/R/S/T display *False* and *Unhealthy*.

6.8.5 Flame Detection Inputs – Loss of Flame Detection

General:

This test checks for the YSIL to detect loss of flame and also verifies that no flame is the fail-safe state.

Test Setup:

For configured (Geiger-Muller) flame detector inputs; connect a function generator as indicated in the following figure:

Flame Detector Simulation

Test Detail:

Perform the following steps five times on each of the flame detector inputs:

- **1.** Set the function generator to 500 Hz, 5 V dc pp saw tooth with a 5 V dc offset.
- **2.** Verify that FDn_Flame = *True*.
- **3.** Remove the function generator signal from the flame detector input.
- **4.** Verify that FDn_Flame transitions to *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

- FDn_Flame transitions to *False* when the function generator signal is disconnected.
- No diagnostics are generated during this test.

6.8.6 TCSA Analog Input Accuracy

General:

Test the accuracy of the YSIL I/O pack analog inputs for the configured I/O pack

Test Setup:

- **1.** Obtain a multimeter and a signal source capable of generating current and voltages within the ranges of the configured YSIL I/O pack.
- **2.** Confirm configured limits for 4-20 mA input types.

A set of test values are provided in the following table. Use only those test values associated with the configured I/O point. Configuration changes are not required.

Test Details:

- For the configured I/O, select the appropriate test values from the following table and apply them to the input.
- Document the value that the YSIL reads for each test value, as seen in the *Input* tab in the ToolboxST application.
- Perform the above tests for each configured input channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

- All measured values must be within 2% of the full range input values for the input accuracy test to be accepted.
- For out of range values using the ToolboxST application, confirm that the YSIL alerts the system that the input is out of range through the *Diagnostics* tab and that the channel goes unhealthy.

Test Values for Configuration Settings

6.8.7 SCSA Analog Input Accuracy

General:

• Test the accuracy of the YSIL I/O pack analog inputs for the configured I/O pack

Test Setup:

- **1.** Obtain a multimeter and a signal source capable of generating current and voltages within the ranges of the configured YSIL I/O pack.
- **2.** Confirm configured limits for 4-20 mA input types.

A set of test values are provided in the following table. Use only those test values associated with the configured I/O point. Configuration changes are not required.

Test Details:

- For the configured I/O, select the appropriate test values from the following table and apply them to the input.
- Document the value that the YSIL reads for each test value, as seen in the *Input* tab in the ToolboxST application.
- Perform the above tests for each configured input channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

- All measured values must be within 2% of the full range input values for the input accuracy test to be accepted.
- For out of range values using the ToolboxST application, confirm that the YSIL alerts the system that the input is out of range through the *Diagnostics* tab and that the channel goes unhealthy.

Test Values for Configuration Settings

6.8.8 SCSA Composite Analog Trip Test

The YSIL can use any of the 4-20 mA analog inputs on the SCSA (AnalogInput01_R,S or T through AnalogInput16_R,S or T TMR input sets) in the Emergency Trip Relay (ETR) logic string. The user must configure AnalogInputx_R, S and T separately in the ToolboxST application to properly enable the analog input to function as a trip input for the ETRs. The user enables the SCSA analog input for tripping by doing the following for AnalogInputx R, AnalogInputx S and AnalogInputx T:

- **1.** Set the TripEnab(CFG) = Enable.
- **2.** Set the TripSetPoint(CFG) = trip value (if exceeded will cause the ETRs to trip).
- **3.** Set the TripDelay(CFG) = duration of time for analog input to exceed the TripSetPoint(CFG) before the trip request to ETRs will go True.

Note If the analog input falls below the TripSetPoint(CFG) for anytime during the TripDelay(CFG) time, the trip delay counter will be reset and the delay time starts over.

Test Case 1: Analog Input level below ETR Trip level

Test Setup:

- **1.** Obtain a multi-meter and a signal source capable of generating current and voltages within the ranges of the configured YSIL I/O pack.
- **2.** Confirm configured limits for 4-20 mA input types.
- **3.** Configure TripEnab(CFG), TripSetPoint(CFG) and TripDelay(CFG) for AnalogInputx_R, S and T to trip at a level of 10 mA after a delay of 100 ms.

Test Details:

- Select an input value equal to 2% of full scale (0.4mA) below the TripSetPoint(CFG) value.
- Perform the above tests for each configured input channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

OPT LED must be green indicating an ETR trip has not occurred due to a Composite Analog Trip.

Test Case 2: Analog Input level above ETR Trip level

Test Setup:

- **1.** Obtain a multi-meter and a signal source capable of generating current and voltages within the ranges of the configured YSIL I/O pack.
- **2.** Confirm configured limits for 4-20 mA input types.
- **3.** Configure TripEnab(CFG), TripSetPoint(CFG) and TripDelay(CFG) for AnalogInputx_R, S and T to trip at a level of 10 mA after a delay of 100 ms.

Test Details:

- Select an input value equal to 2% of full scale (0.4mA) above the TripSetPoint(CFG) value.
- Perform the above tests for each configured input channel.
- After removal of signal from analog channel under test, apply a master reset to clear the YSIL's ETR trip.

Acceptance Criteria:

OPT LED must be RED indicating an ETR trip has occurred due to a Composite Analog Trip.

6.8.9 Thermocouple Input Accuracy

When two or more thermocouples are in near proximity and are expected to measure the same ambient temperature, an alternative test is to record and compare the temperature profile as the thermocouples cool from operational temperature and converge to the same ambient temperature. This alternative test could take several hours for ambient temperature to stabilize.

General:

To test the accuracy of the YSIL pack for various thermocouple configurations.

Test Setup:

Obtain a mV signal source, capable of fractional mV signals.

Alternative:

Use a calibrated heat source or thermocouple test set.

Test Details:

- **1.** For the configured thermocouple, select the applicable thermocouple type from one of the following tables, *Type E Thermocouples*, *Type J Thermocouples*, *Type K Thermocouples*, *Type S Thermocouples*, or *Type T Thermocouples*.
- **2.** Read the Cold Junction temperature from the ToolboxST application Cold Junction tab.
- **3.** Look up the equivalent mV reading for the cold junction temperature under the table heading Cold Junction Compensation. Some interpolation is required.
- **4.** Select one of the mV values in the thermocouple table and inject a mV signal such that the sum of the cold junction mV values and the injected mV signal at the terminal board input equals one of the mV values in the mV column of the thermocouple table. The temperature reading for that thermocouple reading displayed in the ToolboxST application should be equal to the temperature in the table.
- **5.** Repeat step 4 for a second mV value in the thermocouple table.

Example:

For a type E thermocouple with a cold junction reading of 76.9 $\mathrm{^{\circ}F}$ (25 $\mathrm{^{\circ}C}$):

- **1.** In the table, *Type E Thermocouples*, for 76.9 °F (25°C) the cold junction mV compensation is 1.49 mV.
- **2.** Select 10 mV as a thermocouple test value.
- **3.** Inject a mV signal of $(10.0 1.5) = 8.5$ mV at the terminal board screws.
- **4.** The thermocouple should read 307 ± 5 °F (152.8 \pm -15 °C).

Acceptance Criteria:

All measured temperature signals should be within ± 5 °F (-15 °C) of the expected temperature for the input accuracy test to be accepted.

Type E Thermocouples (continued)

Type J Thermocouples

Type K Thermocouples

Type K Thermocouples (continued)

Type S Thermocouples

Type T Thermocouples

Type T Thermocouples (continued)

6.8.10 Open Thermocouple Inputs Detection

General:

This test demonstrates that the YSIL can successfully recognize when a thermocouple input becomes an open circuit.

Test Setup:

Short each configured thermocouple input from the positive to the negative terminal.

Test Details:

- **1.** From the ToolboxST application, confirm that each of the configured thermocouple channels temperature readings is approximately the same as the cold junction.
- **2.** Remove the short on the first channel to create an open circuit.
- **3.** From the Toolbox application, confirm that the pack generates a diagnostic due to the open circuit.
- **4.** Return the channel to a shorted condition.
- **5.** Repeat steps 2 through 4 for each configured channel.

Acceptance Criteria:

All channels properly generate a diagnostic when the circuit is opened.

6.8.11 Thermocouple Input Low Source Voltage

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Details:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for a TMR terminal board disconnect the power supply from two packs).
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the pack's power removed, the pack should turn the inputs unhealthy. Variables: PS18V_YTCC and PS28V_YTCC display *False* and *Unhealthy*.

6.8.12 Digital Output Control

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the Mark VIeS controller can control each output, that outputs are controlled through fault tolerant voting in TMR system, and that there is no cross-interference between outputs.

Relay actuation can be detected several ways:

- **1.** If the device controlled by the relay is safe to actuate it may be used to determine the relay output state.
- **2.** With wetting voltage applied the voltage at relay terminal board may be read.
- **3.** Remove any wetting voltage and read the relay contact path resistance.

For method two and three, removing the terminal board screw blocks and replacing them with test blocks is recommended. For method three, a voltage reading prior to the resistance reading is recommended for safety purposes.

Test Setup:

Perform the appropriate test based on configuration of each of the outputs.

Test Case 1: Test Output Used and Normal

For outputs configured with:

- RelayOutput(CFG) = Used
- **1.** All outputs should initially be turned off.
- **2.** Turn on the relay output.
- **3.** Verify that only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.
- **4.** Repeat for all configured relay outputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

With the output turned on in the controller, only the correct relay on the terminal board is energized.

6.8.13 Contact Input Low Source Voltage

General:

This is a functional test that verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out of limits, and performs an orderly shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Detail:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack, in a TMR system disconnect the power connection from two packs.
- **2.** Confirm that all the inputs go unhealthy (for loss of power on one pack of TMR look for disagreement diagnostic).

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is $\leq 16 \pm 1$ V dc, a diagnostic is generated, and all inputs go unhealthy.

6.8.14 SCSA Contact Input Status

General:

This tests the following items that are configurable on each digital input from the ToolboxST application and verifies that the controllers can receive the input data.

- ContactInput(CFG) (Used/Unused)
- SignalInvert(CFG) (Normal/Invert)
- DiagVoteEnab(CFG) (Enable/Disable)

Test Setup:

Perform the appropriate test case on each of the inputs as they are configured.

Test Detail:

Test Case 1: Test Input Used and Normal

All inputs that are configured with

- $ContentInput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal$
- DiagVoteEnab(CFG) = Enable
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *False*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)* and verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *True* and that there is no voting disagreement diagnostic.
- **3.** Check that there is no cross-interference by verifying that the status of all other inputs is *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *True*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *False*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

Test Case 2: Test Input Used and Invert

All inputs that are configured with

- $ContentInput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Invert$
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *True*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)*.
- **3.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *False*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *True*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

6.8.15 TCSA Contact Input Status

General:

This tests the following items that are configurable on each digital input from the ToolboxST application and verifies that the controllers can receive the input data.

- ContactInput(CFG) (Used/Unused)
- SignalInvert(CFG) (Normal/Invert)

Test Setup:

Perform the appropriate test case on each of the inputs as they are configured.

Test Detail:

Test Case 1: Test Input Used and Normal

All inputs that are configured with

- $ContentInput(CFG) = Used$
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Normal$
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *False*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)* and verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *True* and that there is no voting disagreement diagnostic.
- **3.** Check that there is no cross-interference by verifying that the status of all other inputs is *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *True*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *False*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

Test Case 2: Test Input Used and Invert

All inputs that are configured with

- ContactInput(CFG) = Used
- $SignalInvert(CFG) = Invert$
- **1.** Verify that with the input open, all three controllers indicate the status of the input as *True*.
- **2.** Connect a jumper between *Input X (Positive)* and *Input X (Return)*.
- **3.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the input as *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the inputs are jumpered, all three controllers indicate the status as *False*, all inputs not jumpered have a status of *True*, and there are no voting diagnostics.

6.8.16 TCSA Contact Input Trip Tests

General:

This test verifies action of the contact input trips including trip logic in YSIL firmware.

Test Setup:

Select the Test Case below according to configuration of the Contact Inputs.

Test Detail:

These tests are relevant for TCSA terminal boards.

Test Case 1: TripMode: Direct Trip (CFG)

1. Energize Contact Input and reset trip relays

- **a.** Close contacts on E-Stop button or connect a jumper across E-TRP (H) and TRP (L).
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YSIL such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up. If configured as ETR, then ETR4–6 and ETR7–9.
- **c.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the contact input.

Acceptance criteria:

Controllers correctly read status of contact input.

2. Initiate trip

- **a.** Open the contact input to generate a trip.
- **b.** Verify that each controller (R, S, T) correctly reads the status of the contact input.

Acceptance criteria:

The controllers correctly read the status of the contact input and a diagnostic alarm message is generated indicating that the YSIL has tripped.

3. Confirm trip cannot be reset

Attempt to reset the trip by turning on the MasterReset output in the controller and confirm that the trip cannot be cleared with a reset as long as the contact remains open.

Acceptance criteria:.

The ETRs remain open and the diagnostic alarm message is generated indicating that the YSIL has tripped.

Test Case 2: TripMode: Conditional Trip (CFG)

1. Test Conditional Trip – Negative

- **a.** Close contacts on E-Stop button or connect a jumper to energize the contact input.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YSIL such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** In the controller Vars-CI tab, set the value of trip#_inhibit to *True*.
- **d.** Open E-Stop button or remove the jumper from the contact input and confirm that the contact input does not cause a trip.

Acceptance criteria:

Contact input does not cause trip when inhibit signal is *True*.

2. Test Conditional Trip – Positive

- **a.** Close contacts on E-Stop button or connect a jumper to energize the contact input.
- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YSIL such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-3) are picked up.
- **c.** In the controller Vars-CI tab, set the value of trip#_inhibit to *False*.
- **d.** Open E-Stop button or remove the jumper from the contact input and confirm that the contact input does cause a trip.

Acceptance criteria:

Contact input causes trip when inhibit signal is *False*.

6.8.17 TCSA ETR#_Open Test

General: This test verifies the Vars-Relay output Booleans, ETR1_Open thru ETR9_Open control of the Emergency Trip Relays (ETRs).

Test Setup: These tests check the response of the ETRs on the TCSA terminal board.

These tests can move valves. Take precautions or use bypass procedures.

Test Case 1: ETRs closed for non-trip case

- **1.** Configure K4 K6 and K7 K9 in TripMode
	- **a.** Set TripMode to Enable for both sets of relays.
- **2.** Enable K1_Fdbk K9_Fdbk for Sequence of Events and Diagnostics
	- **a.** Set SeqOfEvents equal to Enable.
	- **b.** Set DiagVoteEnab equal to Enable.
- **3.** Set ETRs in "non-trip" state
	- **a.** Set all ETR#_Open output Booleans to False.
	- **b.** Clear all trip sources and reset the YSIL such that the emergency trip relays (ETR1-9) are picked up.
- **4.** Verify that the relay feedbacks, K1_Fdbk thru K9_Fdbk display the ETRs energized.

Acceptance Criteria: The emergency trip relays are closed and all controllers read the status correctly.

Test Case 2: ETRs opened for trip case

- **1.** Initiate ETR Trip Condition
	- **a.** Set ETR1_Open output Boolean to True.
- **2.** Verify that the relay feedback, K1_Fdbk displays the ETR1 de-energized or open (Trip state).
- **3.** Verify that the controllers read the trip state for K1.
- **4.** Repeat steps 1 through 3 for all nine relays.

Acceptance Criteria: The emergency trip relays are open and all controllers read the status correctly.

6.9 YTUR Test Procedures

Configurable items in the YTUR pack are identified in this test plan by including (CFG) at the end of the name of the item. Any configurable items that must be set for a particular test are defined in the detailed test instructions below. If a setting is not given for a configurable item, it is not relevant to that test.

- Unless otherwise noted, verify that there are no diagnostics faults on the YTUR pack under test prior to performing each test case.
- Any diagnostic fault(s) that are expected to occur as a result of performing a test case are detailed in the acceptance criteria for the test case.
- If additional diagnostics faults are generated that are not detailed in the acceptance criteria, they must be fully explained prior to acceptance of the test.

The following tests can be performed in any order. Individual steps within a test should be performed in the order presented.

6.9.1 Speed Inputs Accuracy

General:

This test checks characteristics of speed inputs (range and accuracy) and verifies that YTUR supports applications by allowing speed inputs to be sent to the controllers without cross-interference.

Alternative Accuracy Test:

Compare YTUR speed signal at several different operating points with BPCS speed signals.

Test Setup:

Connect an oscilloscope to the speed sensor terminal board inputs to measure the pulse rates from the speed pickups

Or

Disconnect the speed sensor inputs and configure a function generator for a 9 V pp sine wave output with zero offset to provide a reference speed signal to the pulse rate inputs.

Speed Input Accuracy

Test Details

- **1.** For at least two speeds in the range of 2 to 20,000 Hz, apply a speed signal and record the value of speed reported by the controller.
- **2.** Verify that the channel being stimulated reads the correct value of speed and that all inputs which are not being stimulated read zero.
- **3.** Repeat steps 1 and 2 on all configured pulse rate inputs.

Acceptance Criteria:

The speed Input function will have less than a 1% deviation between the actual steady state field signal and the reported value.

- Each channel reads the correct value of speed when stimulated.
- All inputs that are not being stimulated read zero.
- There should be no diagnostics.

6.9.2 TRPA E-Stop Input

General:

This test verifies that the E-Stop input, available on the TRPA, can drive the trip relay outputs and that this input can be used to cross-trip the YPRO trip logic.

Test Setup:

Note This test assumes that the trip solenoids are isolated from the circuit.

For each trip relay output, connect dummy loads to simulate trip solenoids as follows:

- **1.** Connect one side of an appropriately sized resistor (10 k Ω 2 W) to the positive side of the trip relay output.
- **2.** Connect the other side of the resistor to the positive side of a power supply (output voltage of power supply should be set to the nominal trip circuit voltage).
- **3.** Connect the negative side of the power supply to the negative side of the trip relay output.

Test Details

- **1.** Energize the E-Stop input and reset the trip relays (clear all trip sources and reset the YTUR such that the trip relays (PTR1-2) are picked up).
- **2.** Verify that each controller (R, S, and T) correctly reads the status of the E-Stop input (KESTOP1_Fdbk).
- **3.** Initiate an E-Stop Trip.
- **4.** Verify the PTR's are de-energized (dropped out and that each controller (R, S, and T) correctly reads the status of the E-Stop input (KESTOP1_Fdbk).

Acceptance criteria:

When the E-Stop is energized (closed) the Primary Trip Relays (PTR) are energized (picked up), when the E-Stop is open the PTR's are de-energized (dropped out).

6.9.3 Flame Detection Inputs – Loss of Flame Detection

General:

This test checks for the YTUR to detect loss of flame and also verifies that no flame is the fail-safe state.

Test Setup:

For configured (Geiger-Muller) flame detector inputs; connect a function generator as indicated in the following figure:

Flame Detector Simulation

Test Detail:

Perform the following steps five times on each of the flame detector inputs:

- **1.** Set the function generator to 500 Hz, 5 V dc pp saw tooth with a 5 V dc offset.
- **2.** Verify that FDn_Flame = *True*.
- **3.** Remove the function generator signal from the flame detector input.
- **4.** Verify that FDn_Flame transitions to *False*.

Acceptance Criteria:

- FDn_Flame transitions to *False* when the function generator signal is disconnected.
- No diagnostics are generated during this test.

6.9.4 Low Source Voltage

General:

This test verifies that the pack monitors its 28 V dc supply, generates diagnostics if the supply is out of limits, and performs an orderly shutdown if power supply voltage is too low for safe operation.

Test Setup:

Prepare system for a fail-safe response from the I/O pack.

Test Case:

- **1.** Disconnect the 28 V dc power supply connection from the pack (for TMR disconnect two 28 V dc power supply connections).
- **2.** Confirm that all the outputs are in their safe state, display unhealthy and a diagnostic is generated.

Acceptance Criteria:

When the supply voltage is less than 16 ± 1 V dc, a diagnostic is generated, all outputs go to their fail safe state and display unhealthy. Variables: PS18V_YTUR and PS28V_YTUR display *False* and *Unhealthy*.

Notes

Appendix: Determine Frame Input Client Completion Time

Use the following procedures to determine frame input completion time with Mark VIeS V06.00 (ControlST V07.02).

Note Information about the timing of frame input times is available in the Controller Advanced Diagnostics.

➢ **To view timing data**

- **1.** Unlock the controller by selecting **Lock/Unlock** from the ToolboxST **Device** menu and clicking **Unlock**.
- **2.** From the **View** menu, select **Diagnostics** and **Controller Advanced Diagnostics** to display the *Controller Advanced Diagnostics* dialog box.
- **3.** Collect the timing information by selecting **Commands**, **Diagnostics**, **Sequencer**, **Client Data**, and then press **Send Command**.

Note Without resetting the timing data, the data will likely have overruns and invalid data as minimum and maximum times.

➢ **To determine maximum completion time**

- **1.** From the *Controller Advanced Diagnostics* dialog box, reset the timing and overrun counters by selecting **Commands**, **Diagnostics**, **Sequencer**, and **Client Data Reset**, then press **Send Command**.
- **2.** Wait for the controller to collect 100,000 samples. For example, if a 10 ms frame period is selected, wait for 100,000 / 100 samples per second / 60 seconds per minute $=$ \sim 17 minutes.
- **3.** View timing data. Refer to the procedure *To view timing data*.
- **4.** Validate timing data. Refer to the procedure *To interpret timing data*.

➢ **To interpret timing data**

- The number of samples is the value in the Activation Count (*ActCount*) column (114206 shown in the following figure) and must be above 100,000 for a sufficiently large data set.
- The number of overruns (*OvrCount*) and re-overruns (*ReOvrCount*) must be 0.
- The maximum stop time of the three input clients, *ptp WhoISDc*, *egd Sweeper*, and the first *App* entry must be ≤ 1.6 ms (1.600). These are highlighted in the following table as 1.489, 1.432 and 0.661, respectively.

Examples of Timing Data

Sequence Frame Clients († prefix indicates critical clients)

Note Use the -t option for client timing information.

Sequence Frame Clients († prefix indicates critical clients)

Note Start and End times are offsets from start of frame.

Examples of Application Timing

The following table lists a set of applications, configurations, and associated maximum input frame client completion time to use to determine if a given application will be compatible with the Mark VIeS Safety control. *This is for informational* purposes only and is not meant to replace the user from collecting timing data from their actual physical system.

